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DEFINITION OF PURPOSE .AND PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The fonnation of coalitions in multiparty, competitive political 
systems is essential where such behavior is preferable to acting alone 
for purposes of agreed-upon allocation and distribution of resources and 
values. This study will attempt to explain the fonnation of coalitions, 
where such coalition situations are present, by applying two major 
theories: William Riker' s "size principle" and Michael Leiserson' s 
''bargaining theory." These two theories will be applied to the fonna-
tion of coalitions in Chile, with a major focus on the Popular Unity 
coalition in 1970. The principal purpose of the application of these 
two theories is to find out which can best be applied to real situations. 
Despite the fact that we are dealing with a single nation, analysis will 
focus on several major coalitions in Chilean history, under different 
conditions, in an attempt to test the predictive potential of" these two 
theories • 
Chile presents an ideal case for studying coalitions, since major 
constitutional factors make it so. 1 The direct election of the 
1 For an excellent study of coalition situations in Chile see 
Orville G. Cope, Coalition Fonnation, Christian Democracy and The 1970 
Presidential El·ection in Chile (Inst. of Govt. Res., Univ.of Ariz_! __ 
No. 11, Tucson, 1972). 
1 
2 
President, where more than two candidates may seek office and where a 
majority is necessary to win, has led candidates to form coalitions to 
insure not only popular support but congressional support as well. 
Chile represents also the type of political system where power is 
activated through the election process and where constitutional 
guarantees have insured party activity as a means of acquiring such 
power. 
The election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1970, with 
the support of a Popular Unity coalition of Marxist and left-of-center 
political parties, drew worldwide attention because of the mere accept-
ance of such a coalition, notwithstanding the claim by Allende that "the 
people have succeeded in taking the helm of their destiny to embark on a 
democratic course towards Socialism." 2 Allende received only 36.2 per 
cent of the popular vote and had to be elected by the Congress after 
some political maneuvers and promises, and because of a tradition by the 
Congress of always choosing the candidate with the most popular votes. 
It is of vital significance to the study of political coalitions to 
understand the process of coalition formation applicable in this situa-
tion and probable in others. 
It must be clear at the outset that this study is concerned with the 
. 
period up to the election of Allende and not with the maintenance of ,h:is ,, 
coalition. The events of October and November, 1973, may, in fact, be 
connected with the failure to maintain a strong and vi~ble coalition 
and it may be speculated that the future of coalition situations, in 
light of recent statements concerning the promulgation of a new 
2 
Dale L. Johnson, The Chilean Road to Socialism (New York, 1973), 
p, 166. 
constitution, is precarious at best. However, it is only now, after 
the recent coup d 1 etat, that coalition situations have, in tenns of 
parties, ceased. 
3 
This chapter will review the existing literature on coalition 
behavior and will describe the two theories to be applied in Chapter IV, 
Chapter 11 describes the origins of the party system and provides 
insight into the traditional and historical developments that have 
affected coalition behavior. Chapter 111 applies the two theories to 
the historical factors and attempts to establish which theory can best 
predict coalition fonnation in Chile. The focus of this application 
will be on the 1970 election. The lack of rigid statistical applica-
tions throughout this study is due mainly to the fact that data needed 
for such analysis is not available, and the computations often tend to 
have abstract meanings not always applicable to real situations. The 
author feels that the two theories can be tested empirically without 
need for quantificatio'n. 
Design of the Study 
This study 1 s principal concern is to evaluate the utility of "size" 
as a predictor in the fonnation of political coalitions. The method 
used in the investigation of this problem is one that avails itself of 
the existing literature on the origins and development of the Chilean 
party system and party coalition situations. It also draws from know-
ledge and use of the two major theories concerned with "size," that of 
William Riker and Michael Leiserson. To this end, a rather extensive 
account of party origins provides a comparative point of reference that 
reveals differences in coalition situations. The application of the 
two theories will be done through the use of existing electoral data 
for purposes of substantiating the analysis and predictions contained 
herein, 
4 
The utility of the two theories will simply be analyzed in terms 
of how well each theory contributes to an understanding and to the 
prediction of Chilean coalition patterns. It is important to note, 
however, that this study also concerns itself with the conditions under 
which coalition situations in Chile operate, sbc,thatc thet method of 
analysis here comes primarily from the works of noted North American 
and Latin American scholars and students of Chilean politics, such as 
Federico Gil, Eduardo Cruz-Coke, Ben G, Burnett, Orville Cope, Peter 
Snow, and Arturo Valenzuela. From this cross-section of the literature 
on Chilean politics, a balanced deduction of factors that are important 
in explaining coalition behavior will be made by evaluating, sorting, 
and organizing this material in a logical fashion. This will entail 
inferences on the part of the author as to the importance of the 
information available. 
Implicit in the foregoing observations is the idea that coalition 
formation is an important technique in the distribution of power. This 
study will focus on such questions as: What are coalition situations? 
What conditions or sets of factors in Chilean politics lend themselves 
to coalition situations? How is "size" an important concept with 
regard to the formation of coalitions? What are some of the major 
works in coalition behavior that are mainly concerned with size and why 
do they orient themselves to this concept? In what manner have the 
theories of Riker and Leiserson contributed to the prediction of real 
situations in coalition formation? Finally, which of the two theories 
5 
serves as a better predictor of coalition formation in the Chilean 
political setting? As a general framework for this study, it will be 
necessary only to define certain important concepts. However, they may 
be made operational in a different fashion by the models described 
hereafter. 
A l'c6alition11 will be defined as any 
group of individuals or groups of individuals who, (l) agree 
to pursue a common and articulated goal, (2) pool their rele-
vant resources in pursuit of this goal, (3) engage in 
conscious communication concerning the goal and the means of 
obtaining it, and (4) agree on the distributign of the payoff 
(benefits), received when obtaining the goal. 
A "winning coalition" will, in turn, be defined as one that gains 
authority over others by virtue of size in relation to the power 
decision rule. A "coalition situation" is one in which coalition 
fonnation is preferable to acting alone for purposes of agreed-upon 
allocation and distribution of resources and values. "Payoffs" are the 
rewards resulting from joining a particular coalition and winning. 
Finally, a 11 decision rule" is the minimum number of resources needed to 
control decisions. 
To the extent that this study offers explanations regarding coali-
tion formation, particularly as they apply to Chile, the following 
hypotheses are proposed to encompass the general framework of the study. 
Hypothesis A 
In multiparty competitive systems, where elections represent the 
principal mobilizing process and where pluralities result, there 
is a tendency for coalition situations to occur. 
3E, W. Kelley, "Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), p. 63. 
Hypothesis B 
Under certain coalition situations, the primary goal of partici-
pants is winning and, therefore, "size" becomes a major concern 
with regard to coalition fonnation. 
Hypothesis C 
In coalition situations where size is a primary concern, partici-
pants will seek minimtnn winning coalitions to insure the greatest 
distribution of payoff per member of the winning coalition. 
Review of the Literature 
Studies of coalition behavior have evolved from the descriptive-
analytical works of such authors as Maurice Duverger in his classic 
work, Political Parties, which deals essentially with party organiza-
tion and alliances and provides an interesting, although limited, 
classificatory scheme for alliance formation in multiparty systems. 4 
Many of the descriptive-analytical works have been oriented toward 
factual narrations of the workings of coalitions and alliances, with a 
traditional emphasis toward Western European countries. Duverger 1 s 
6 
work, published in 1951, provides a fundamental basis for understanding 
party origins, organizations, leadership and alignments, but has the 
major weakness of its European bias and its claim that political 
systems such as those found in Latiri America are still in the !-'pre-
historic era of parties.11 5 This observation may not hold true in Chile 
4see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1951); also 
see Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Alliance of Subcoalitions," in his Political 
Parties: !::_ Behavioral Analysis (Skokie, Ill., 1964). 
5 
Duverger, p. 228. 
7 
where political parties have played a key role in the electoral process 
since the 1920 1 s, due mainly to strong party organization. 
Since Duverger, the descriptive school has taken a more analytical 
approach, well represented by case studies of particular systems and 
h · 1· · b h · 6 t e1r coa 1t1on e av1or. Among them is the work of Dankwart Rustow 
on the Swedish political system. 7 Rustow analyefes the functions and 
activities of the Swedish government with respect to the tactics 
employed in the legislative process and the building of political 
coalitions. As he states, 11Swedish politics ••• has consistently faced 
situations where positive decisions could result only from compromise. 8 
This condition, which has been essential to the Swedish system, has 
been used effectively by the parties to ease conflict and promote a 
certain degree of stability. There are many similarities between Chile 
and Sweden, such as the high regard for law and constitutional guaran-
tees, early periods of oligarchial domination, a strong sense of tradi-
tion and custom, multipartism, large numbers of coalitions throughout 
6For an excellent cross-section of descriptive case studies as 
well as theoretical and methodological studies, see Sven Groennings, 
E.W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of Coalition 
Behavior (New York, 1970); also see E. W. Kelley, "Techniques of Study-
ing Coalition Formation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII 
(1968), pp, 62-84; H. P, Secher, 11Coalitio~Government: The Case of 
the Second Austrian Republic," American Political Science Review, Is1l. 
(1958), pp. 791-808; Duncan MacRae, "In trap arty Divisions and Cabinet 
Coalitions in the Fourth_ French Republic," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, V (1963), pp. 163-211; Erik Damgaard, 11Th~~arlia-
mentary Basis of Danish Governments: The Patterns of Coalition 
Formation," Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969). _ 
7see Dankwart Rustow, The Politics of Compromise (Princeton, 
1955). For a somewhat opposite view with regard to French pol~tics, 
see Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford, Calif., 
1959). 
8 
Rustow, p. 230. 
their histories and many other governmental practices which would make 
a comparative study quite appropriate. 
Another analytical case study of coalition politics is that of 
Peter Merkl on West Geno.any. Merkl describes the process of coalition 
politics as follows: 
Coalition politics in Western parliamentary democracies is 
the competition for majority control among several parlia-
mentary groups which relate to one another in a peculiar way 
in the national legislature. Their peculiar relationship 
can be defined in tenns of relative size and compatibility, 
which detennine the patterns of likely alliances and their 
stability. In a broader sense, coalition politics is at the 
intersection of three streams of bargaining p9ocesses that 
tend to transcend the confines of parliame~t. · 
8 
These processes described by Merkl are party cohesion, bargaining with 
the voter and bargaining with other groups. lO His analysis begins with 
a study of coalitions at the state level and eventually moves to study 
I 
the emergence of coalitions at the federal level with a focus on 
bargaining. Merkl is particularly interested in showing how bargaining 
relates to internal dissent in coalitions for certain periods of time. 
A work of similar magnitude is that of Mic4ael Leiserson on coali-
tions in Japan. Here the focus is on factions making up coalitions, 
particularly the struggle for power by factions of the Liberal-
Democratic Party or the LPn. 11 
Although these various works and case studies are rather limited 
9Peter H. Merkl, ''Coalition Politics in West Geno.any," in Sven 
Groennings, E.W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of 
Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), p. 14. · 
lOibid., P• 15. 
UMichael Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan,'' in Sven 
Groennings, E.W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of 
Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), p. 94. 
.9 
in their general scope (as this particular study will be), they offer 
the rudiments for developing further studies of more general or 
theoretical scheme. 
Recent studies of coalition behavior oriented toward theory formu-
lation have been largely derived from two modes of analysis: the 
mathematical or game theory approach, and the sociopsychological 
12 approach. The former emerged largely from the work of John Von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
in which the authors applied mathematical theories to explain or under-
d . b h . 13 stan economic e avior. The essence of their work was the theory of 
games which explained decisions concerning situations of conflict. The 
essential precept consists in the maximization of goals.,, and in the 
awareness of the choices or goals of others in what is called the 
14 
"cross-purposes optimization problem." With regard to the strategy 
in games, Von Neumann and Morgenstern's most important contribution was 
the theory of rationality in two-person, zero-sum games. This was the 
minimax theorem regarding rational action in choosing alternatives, 
that is, the best possible choice in order to maximize goals. A 
12sociopsychological studies will not be discussed in this study 
since their applications are better adapted to small-group behavior and 
simulation models. Some of the more important works in this area are: 
Theodore Caplow, "A Theory of Coalitions in the Tripod," American 
Sociological Review, XIX (1956), pp. 23-29, 489-493; Jerome Chertkoff, 
11A Revision of Caplow 1 s Coalition Theory," Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 111 (1967), pp, 1.72-177; and William A. Gamson, 11 A 
Theory Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review, XXVI ( 1961), 
PP• 373-382. 
13 
See John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1953). 
14Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social 
Behavior (New York, 1964), ~-
10 
zero-sum condition would be one in which the gains of one actor would 
exactly equal the losses of the other in a two person game (1-[a+b+ ••• 
x]=O). The application of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution has 
been, perhaps, best developed for the political setting by William 
Riker•s Theory of Political Coalitions. 15 Riker's fundamental theory 
is based on the well known 11 size principle" which states: "Inn-person, 
zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted, where players are 
rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning 
16 coalitions occur. 11 ·. The sociological law surrounding the theory is: 
11ln social situations similar ton-person, zero-sum games with side 
payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe 
17 will insure winning and no larger." 
The contention, therefore, is that actors will not settle for less 
than the maximum payoff and that can only be achieved with a minimum 
' ' • ' h d ' • 1 f I n+l winning size wit a ecision rue o: m = ~ 2-. The assumption of 
rationality as defined by Riker is that, in choosing alternatives, an 
actor picks that "alternative leading to the more preferred outcome,'' 
despite the fact that certain outcomes may.detract from the person's 
ultimate goal, since the decision is itself a rational act and irra-
. 1 · . . d . . 18 tiona ity is in ecision. As to the assumption of perfect infonnatio~ 
"if one participant, a, knows what move or moves another, b, has made, 
15see William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New 
Haven, Conn., 1962). 
16Ibid. , p. 32. 
17Ibid., pp, 32-33, 
18 b'd Ii., p, 19. 
11 
then we shall say that, a, has perfect information about, b. 11 19 This 
assumption is difficult to meet in real situations, since the 
activities of one actor may be secretive enough to prevent another from 
having perfect information; however, inferences from past actions and 
relevant variables affecting actor b, may help a, in an intuitive guess 
of what b may do. As to the concept of side payments this simply 
refers to payments used to induce other actors to join a specified 
coalition. The manner in which Riker's theory may predict outcomes can 
be demonstrated through a simple example. Table I shows the strength 
of three parties (C, L, and S). 
TABLE I 











The prediction of possible outcomes (Table II below) shows the 
possible winning coalitions through a calculation of the division of 
payoffs to each partner: 
19Ibid., p. 78. 
% of payoffs = # of seats of a particular party 
# of seats (i) +#of seats (x) 
According to these calculations, C would choose S over L since its 
distribution clearly maximizes its payoffs. S would choose L for 
similar reasons and L would also choose S. Since Land S choose each 
12 
other, this according to Riker, would be a "uniquely preferable coali-
tion. 11 With regard to the actual size, LS is closest to the decision 
points since it comprises 57 seats as opposed to 73 for CL, 70 for CS, 
and 100 for c, L, S. 
TABLE 11. 
POSSIBLE WINNING COALITIONS FOR 
PARTIES c, L, ANDS 
Possible Winning % OLPayoffs 
Coalitions c L s 
CL 56 44 0 
cs 61 0 39 
LS 0 53 47 
CLS 43 34 23 
The limitations of Riker•s theory (i.e., meeting all asstnnptions), 
have been serious enough for some to state that its utility in real 
world situations is limited. However, Riker himself admits this 
problem and, in some rather rigorous discussions of proto-coalitions 
and larger than minimtnn w~nning size coalitions, Riker has attempted to 
make his model more useful. Barbara Hinckley' s work on coalitions in 
13 
the United States Congress asstttnes that games are continuous rather than 
discrete and, therefore, the decision to fonn coalitions is largely 
based on infonnation costs, so that some larger than minimtttn winning 
1 . . 20 coa 1t1ons occur. This is not a refutation of Riker•s model, but 
simply an expansion of the discussion on perfect infonnation. As a 
result, this study will apply Riker's model with the asstttnption that 
political games are continuous, but that minimum winning coalitions 
will continue to be sought. 
The second model to be applied in this study is that proposed by 
Michael Leiserson, -wh,ich, like Riker' s, is largely derived from Von 
21 Netttnann and Morgenstern, Leiserson posits five basic assumptions: 
(1) actors will attempt to fonn winning coalitions, (2) payoffs will go 
only to those actors in the actual winning coalition, (3) actors are 
aware of possible alignments that produce winning coalitions, (4) 
actors know the size of their payoffs in all possible combinations, and 
finally (5) coalition situations are constant-sum and simple. 22 This 
last assumption is perhaps the most important in differentiating 
between Leiserson's theory and the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. 
The constant-sum situation is one where total payoffs to the winning 
coalition are the same regardless of its composition, and, by a simple 
coalition situation, Leiserson refers to a situation where each possible 
20Barbara Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and I.deological 
Distance," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (1972), pp, 197-
-207. 
21Michael Leiserson, "Coalitions in Politics: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1966). 
22Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan,'' pp. 80-102. 
14 
combination is either winning or losing. 23 Again, the decision rule is 
m =;= n;l, and the predictable outcome would be a minimal winning coali-
tion (a winning coalition which, if an actor left it, would become a 
losing coalition). The fundamental differenc~ between Riker's predic-
tion and Leiserson's prediction is that to Riker a minimal winning 
coalition is one which is closest to the decision point and where each 
player will maximize his payoffs, while to Leiserson, it is the one 
which would contain no unnecessary partners. 
The rigid asstnnptions underlying Riker's principle produce outcomes 
, ' 
where actors are simply concerned with maximization. Therefore, they 
seek the smallest possible coalitions in order to have fewer members 
among whom to distribute payoffs and ther~by increase their own respec-
, 
tive payoffs. I.f this is true, then coalitions of ideologically diverse 
members would occur. Leiserson's principle, on the other hand, makes 
I 
allowances for such factors as ideological position and, with less 
rigidity in his asstnnptions, maintains that actors will seek minimtnn 
winning coalitions that will often include more members than absolutely 
necessary to win, but. will contain no unnecessary members. To Riker, 
political parties would have to be dissoluble so that certain members 
could be excluded from coalitions. To Leiserson this is not necessary. 
Table Ill. shows the flexibility of Leiserson I s principle by allowing 
minimtnn winning coalitions with more than just two parties. Riker would 
say that all coalitions in Table Ill. with more than two, as in the case 
of DA, would not occur under his asstnnptions. 
23Eric C, Browne, ''Testing the Theories of Coalition Fonnation in 




PREDICTIONS BASED ON LEISERSON 1 S MODEL 
Party - Size Possible vi°" 
A 15 ABCE = 51 
B 17 ABEF = 54 
c 10 ABCF = 55 
D 36 DA= 51 
E 9 DB = 53 
F 13 DCE = 55 
DEF = 58 
100 DCF = 59 
The significance of this difference is that Leiserson actors may 
settle for less than the optimal but would not share with more players 
than necessary to win. In this hypothetical multiparty setting there 
are 57 possible coalitions of which only eight are minimal winning (vi°"). 
Leiserson would predict all eight, Riker would predict only one, DA. 
However, Leiserson has modified the application of his model by 
introducing a "bargaining proposition" which states that as the "number 
of actors increases, there is a tendency to form a vi°" with as few 
"bl 24 actors as poss1 e." Therefore, in Table III, Leiserson's predic-
tions would be narrowed to DA and DB. 
If we return to Table I on page 11, we see that Riker predicts.LS 
as the minimum winning coalition; however, Leiserson would predict not 
24Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan," p. 90. 
16 
only LS, but CL and CS. As a result, Leiserson predicts all the 
possible outcomes predicted by Riker. 
There are two important models for coalition formation that are 
concerned with size as a primary variable in prediction and, therefore, 
they seem appropriate for application to this study. There are, how-
ever, other studies that point to different variables and use different 
conceptual techniques, One of these is the concept of "conflict of 
interest" as a strategic interaction to predict coalition behavior. 
This concept is found in the work of Robert Axelrod and it is based on 
25 the spatial model of Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
Another technique proposed for explanation of coalition formation is 
one which looks at decision costs. This technique is treated thorough-
ly by Charled Adrian and Charles Press. They argue that: 
••• the precise membership in the winning coalition in any 
group must be determined by an algebraic sUitlil}ation of at 
least eight decision costs and that these costs are deter-
mined by various economic2gnd psychological factors existing 
in the political setting. 
Another technique is to look at the ranking of possible criteria for 
coalition formation concerning both "size'' and "ideologic diversity." 
Michael Taylor argues that an actor's preferences will determine the 
relative importance of such criteria and that its ranking will affect 
. d d" . 27 size an 1vers1ty. There are, of course, many other possibilities, 
25 
See Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago, 1970). 
26 
Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition 
Formation," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), pp, 562-563. 
27Michael Taylor, "Notes and Comments on the Theory of Government 
Coalition Formation," British Journal of Political Science, II (i972), 
pp. 361-386. 
17 
but size continues to be the single most important criterion, and, in 
this respect, the theories of Riker and Leiserson have made significant 
inroads. 
CHAPTER II 
PARTY ORIGINS AND CHILEAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT (1818 - 1925) 
Introduction 
The development of political life in Chile is dependent on and 
could not have been conceived without strong political parti,es. Among 
all Latin American nations, Chile is unique in that its polftical 
parties are solidly based on programs and ideological positions which 
have deep roots in the nineteenth century. Chile has not had any real 
experience with "personalismd," or movements organized around the 
personal philosophy of one m!in, .qs has often been the case in other 
Latin American states, rather, the parties have constituted, from time 
to time, real national movements with wide support. 
This chapter will concern itself with the origins of political 
parties in Chile, since Chilean politics have been greatly influenced by 
tradition. It was in the nineteenth century that Chile-began to move 
\ 
from a two-party system into a multiparty system, eventually establish-
ing the 1925 Constitution, which greatly enhanced the mobility of 
parties by the introduction of such legal returns as the extension of 
the suffrage. From this period, three basic characteristics about the 
Chilean system have emerged: (1) the fractionalization of parties, 
which enabled small parties to survive by joining into coalitions; 
18 
19 
(2) the competitive nature of the electoral process; and (3) the coali-
tion nature of Chilean party behavior and the consolidation process in 
the system itself, which has encouraged the parties to form permanent 
alliances. 1 
1818 - 1925 
Chile achieved its independence from Spain in 1818, but the social, 
economic, and political structures that existed prior to independence 
remained strong and viable. 
The war against Spain had been a social revolution only in the 
very limited sense of being a class conflict between the 
creoles (Chileans of Indian blood) and Spaniards. There had 
been no rising o~ the masses, no fundamental alteration in the 
class structure. 
As a result, Chile like many other Latin American cou'..tri:es, was not 
capable of sustaining a truly representative government. From 1818 to 
1823, Chile was' ruled by its revolutionary hero and "Supreme Dictator," 
Bernardo O'Higgins. His government made some serious attempts at 
reforms, from the development of new towns and the establishment of a 
police force, to the organization of an educational system. But his 
somewhat anticlerical stand and his attempts at social reforms did not 
reflect the wishes of the aristocracy, and contributed to his downfall 
in 1823. His successor, Ramd"n Freire, continued the reforms with more 
10rville G. Cope, in "The 1965 Congressional Election in Chile: an 
Analysis," Journal of Inter-American Studies, X (1968), p. 257, has 
written: "Unlike other methods of mobilizing political power in some 
Latin American nations, elections in Chile have provided peaceful 
changes in the personnel of the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government and have contributed to the elucidation of political, econom-
ic, and international issues facing a developing urban society." 
2 
John R, Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Westport, 1970), 
P• 8. 
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success by toning down his anticlericalism, and in 1826 a new constitu-
tion was drawn up which established a federal government. 
During the period from 1824 to 1829, political ideas began to fonn 
around two different factions. These two factions, which were later to 
develop into the Liberal and Conservative Parties, were not coherent or 
organized, since they overlapped and their respective supporters often 
made alliances by occasionally shifting positions. As in other Latin 
American countries, the factions "were drawn from the ranks of the top 
few per cent who were the custodians of the political power structure. 
No grass roots existed or were even dreamed of. 11 3 The divisions in 
almost all Latin American countries were basically along two main 
political tendencies: liberalism and conservatism. The conservatives 
were known as the "pelucones" or bigwigs. (This is in reference to the 
traditional wigs used by the aristocracy). 4 The pelucd'n conservatives 
were complemented (and in the end, controlled) by a less doctrinaire 
but more inflexible faction known as the "estanqueros," or more simply 
as the Estanco. 11The estanqueros believed in tough centralized govern-
ment and an end to political debate. 11 5 It was not until 1829 that a 
coalition of conservative forces led by Diego Portales was able to gain 
power. The other faction, the liberals, was often referred to as the 
11pipiolos", or beginners. They favored federalism, the liberation of 
· social institutions and individual freedoms •. • ''The tendency particularly 
3Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," 
Western Political Quarterly, X (1957)! 
4Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1818-
1833 (Cambridge, 1967~ 295. --
5Ibid., p. 296. 
noticeable among liberals of all descriptions was the desire to limit 
the power of the executive.116 
These divisions were inherent in most of Latin America during the 
early republican years. Chile experienced short periods of liberalism 
and federalism which, by the end of the 1820•s, had led to general 
disorder and turmoil. Again, as in other Latin American countries, 
Chile 1 s federal-unitary struggle was eventually resolved by the 
emergence of strong central authority in the hands of the executive. 7 
It is important to note, however, that this division of liberals and 
21 
conservatives was an "intra-ruling class struggle," and that the reforms 
advocated by the liberals were not aimed at attracting the support of 
those outside the landholding elite. 8 The liberals, like the conserva-
tives, were not apt to jeopardize their position as members of the 
elite. 
In 1829, civil war broke out due mainly to the reformist policies 
of the liberals who had in that year won a majority in Congress. In 
fact, it has been speculated that their victory in Congress was attribu-
table to the conservative rebellion. The conservatives were successful 
in defeating liberal forces and in ending a period of liberalism and 
constitutional experimentation. General Joaqu{n Prieto, the leader of 
the revolt, became president, although real power was in the hands of 
Diego Portales, who was to become one of the most influential and 
6Ibid., p. 300. 
7Peter Ranis, "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American 
Political Parties," Journal of Politics, XXX (1968)~ 
8James Petras, Politics and Social 'Forces in Chilean Development 
(Berkeley, 1969), p, 78. 
effective leaders in Chilean history. In 1833 a new constitution was 
drawn up: 
The legal framework for Portalesian philosophy of government 
was provided by the Constitution of 1833, destined to remain 
in force until 1925. This conservative document not only 
restricted the suffrage through literacy and property quali-
fications, but also provided for a very strong presidency by 
giving the Chief Executive the power to select and control 
directly all administrative officials, to name Supreme Court 
justices and to veto Congressional legislation. Further 
reflecting its aristocratic origin, it reestablished the right 
of primogeniture (which had been abolished under the liberal 
regime) and declared Roman Catholicism the state religion, at 
the same time pro~ibiting the "public exercise" of any other 
faith whatsoever. 
Although the restrictions on suffrage kept many elements of the 
22 
population out of the election process, it eventually led to the forma-
tion of viable parties by promoting cohesion and organization on the 
part of the two major factions. By the 1840's, liberals were beginning 
to come out from hiding, European radicalism had influenced many young 
aristocrats, and a new Liberal Party.was' formed. During the administra-
tion of Manuel Montt, in 1856, a very significant set of events took 
place. Montt, an independent-minded President, had a minor dispute with 
the Church. This gave extreme liberal and conservative elements an 
opportunity to revolt. The ultramontane faction of Montt's conservative 
10 government broke away and formed the Conservative Party. The Conserv-
atives became the chief supporters of the Church and strong critics of 
presidential supremacy. The more extreme liberals, who had previously 
formed the Liberal Party, joined the conservatives in their opposition 
to Montt, This was countered by a·coalition of moderate conservatives 
9 ·Stevenson, p. 12. 
10 
Ultramonttane refers to greater supremacy and authority by the 
Roman Catholic Church over national affairs. 
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and liberals who formed· the National Party. The union of conservatives 
and liberals, although it lasted only a short while, marked the begin-
ning of a unique trend in Chilean politics that eventually culminated in 
a permanent alliance in 1966. At this point it is difficult to explain 
just where on the political spectrip:n these parties appeared_yi:s,._~":'.Yi~ the 
Right, Center, or Left. Maurice Duverger' s rather limited explanation 
that the "dilution" of the doctrine of one party forms by its very 
nature a centrist party, cannot be shown to have occurred at this time.ll 
The only significant issue dividing the ruling oligarchy was 
the relationship between church and state. Clerical bodies 
themselves were great landowners ••• Most ltb~rals were 
hacendados, and their aim in supporting the m6ve to separate 
church and state was to reduce the political influence of a 
small, ultraconservative group. 12 
In 1861, a fourth party evolved out of a pplit in the Liberal 
Party. This new group, which called itself the Radical Party, was 
composed of progressive liberals who wanted faster moves in the direc-
tion of political and social reform. 13 Between 1861 and 1873, several 
coalitions were formed, but the general trend was for a greater split 
between Liberals and Conservatives over the "theological questions." In 
1873, the new "Liberal Alliance" was formed, made up of Liberals, 
Radicals, and the old Nationals. 14 This liberal current introduced 
certain new reforms, such as the extension of suffrage and greater 
representation of minorities. "With this growth of liberalism, public 
11Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1954), p. 231. 
12 Petras, p. 87. 
13 For an excellent study of the Radical Party, its philosophy and 
development, see, Florencio Duran Bernales, El Partido Radical 
(Santiago; Editorial Nascimento, ·1958). 
14 . 
Stevenson, p, 16. 
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15 opinion strengthened and assumed a broader sweep." This result was a 
civil uprising, which was supported by large sectors of the population 
and led by the Congress. Balmaceda reacted by proclaiming a dictator-
ship, but eight months later it fell and Balmaceda committed suicide. 
The success of the parliamentary party in this great constitu-
tional struggle was held to have settled two points absolutely 
and forever. Hereafter there should be no executive interfer-
ence with the liberty of election. That political function 
should be entirely disassociated from the activities of the 
central administration and the electorate should be allowed 
freely to express its choice. The other principle was that no 
president should attempt to govern without a cabinet which 16 
expressed the will of the majority in the chamber of deputies. 
From 1891 to 1925, presidential authority was to disappear almost 
entirely. Political parties multiplied rapidly and the Congress wielded 
unrestricted powers. By the end of the nineteenth century, political 
parties were identifiable, organized and cohesive. Perhaps it would be 
appropriate to conclude the ~iscussion of this period by describing the 
party spectrum as Chile entered the modern period. 
The Conservative Party remained the party of the Church. Its 
support came not only from the clergy but from those among the masses 
that the Church could influence. The Conservatives opposed public 
education under the control of secular institutions, favored proportion-
al representation, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Liberals, 
although experiencing some success in government, were seriously 
divided. Paul Reinsch has given an explanation for the problems of the 
Liberal cause: 
1 ?:eaul S. Reinsch,· ''Parliamentary Government in Chile,'' American 
Political Science Review, III (1909), p. 512. 
16 b.d 514 I 1 • , p. • 
.. 
The Liberal Party of Chile has suffered the fate which has 
overcome the group bearing that name in many other countries. 
I ts principles, indeed, are such as appeal to high-minded 
statesmanlike men, yet the party fails in some of the lesser 
arts of politics, and moreover, its principles are often not 
brought into a vital relation with the interests and energies 
of national life. It will always inspire resyect but will 
not always command an irresistable following. 1 
The Liberals were moderately anticlerical, espousing individual 
freedom and the prerogatives of parliament. Their support came mainly 
25 
from the industrial elites and some agricultural sectors. The National 
Party had not espoused very definite principles. Represented by the 
"upper bureaucracy and the banking, commercial and industrial groups," 
it often shifted on issues such as secularism or congressional suprem-
18 
acy. The fourth party, the Radicals, had a popular base of support, 
11 a strong belief in the democratic form of government, in public educa-
19 tion and in freedom from ecclesiastical tutelage." A fifth party 
organized during the late nineteenth century represented labor, but 
since Chile then had only a small labor class, its electoral appeal was 
limited. I ts major role, however, seems to have been ih the "political 
game of alliances and party combinations," but its failure to organize 
· 20 
the labor movement lost that constituency later to the Marxists. · 
Finally, the sixth party, the Liberal Democratic, was weak and tenetless. 
Since most of its constituency was made up of social elites, it could 
not compete with the more traditional Liberals and Conservatives. 
1 \bid., p. 518. 
18 
Petras, p. 97-98. 
19R . h e1nsc, p. 519. 
20 d · 1 h 1· 1 f h 1 ( 1966) Fe er1co G, Gi, Te Po 1tica System~ Ci e Boston, , 
p. 56. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, Chile had securely trans-
fanned itself from a two-party system into a multiparty system. Maurice 
Duverger•s contention that two-party systems are natural but that there 
are tendencies towards "internal division" and "overlapping", thereby 
creating multipartism proved true in Chile. 21 Multipartism in Chile 
led to the fonnation of many coalitions of opposing parties and alli-
ances of parties adhering to the same goals, thereby contributing to the 
stability of the political system. During the parliamentary period 
(1981-1925), there were numerous coalitions and alliances which allowed 
opposing factions a constitutional path for pronouncing their goals. 
In the presidential election of 1920, Arturo Alessandri Palma, 
candidate of the modified ''Liberal Alliance" became the champion of the 
cormnon man with support from Radicals and Democrats. His opposition 
consisted of the old Liberals and Conservatives in a new coalition 
called the National Union. 22 This organization represented the ineffec-
tive and disorganized oligarchial structures of the period. Alessandri.ts 
victory "signified the initial political triumph of socio-economic 
l .b 1· . 23 1 era ism." But the refonns were difficult to enact due to opposi-
tion from the Senate and the National Union. By the end of 1924, 
Alessandri had to ask for help from the anny to try to force Congress 
into allowing him the refonns he wanted. When he realized that the 
situation was out of his control, he fled the country, which then came 
under the leadership of a military junta headed by General Luis 
21 
Duverger, pp. 229-230. 
22 
Stevenson, p. 36. 
2\bid., p, 34. 
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Altamirano, In January, 1925, a coup d etat led by an anny officer, 
Carlos lb.!iiez, brought back Alessandri and with him hopes for .constitu-
tional refonns and social change. These refonns were incorporated in 
the 1925 Constitution which established presidential supremacy. The 
success of Alessandri 1 s refonns was largely due to popular support and 
to the military group that allowed him to return. 24 1.t was also a 
"response to the realization on the part of the country's political 
leaders that only a monistic structure would render the government 
. l 25 operat1ona • " The new Constitution was to provide the nation one of 
the fundamental bases for political stability: that is, the.ability of 
parties and extra political groups (disorganized and decentralized) to 
organize and exist. Some of the major constitutional provisions that 
contributed to this stability were: the guarantee of civil liberties, 
the separation of church and state, the prohibition on Congress to 
dismiss the cabinet, a presidential tenn of six years and election by 
direct ·vote, extension of the suffrage, and presidential power over 
f . l 26 1sca matters. But perhaps the most relevant basis for political 
stability was "the new system of proportional representation, th~ 
selection of the President by Congress if any candidate failed to 
receive a majority of the vote and the separation of the dates of 
congressional and presidential elections. 27 The 1925 Constitution then 
24Gil, Political System, p. ~8. 
25F · J / · ' d S b · 1 · . L . A- • ran,c1sco ose Moreno, Legitimacy· an ta 1 1ty 1n at1n .nu,er1ca 
(New York, 1969), p. 153. 
26Gil, Political System, p. 59. 
27ibid. 
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served to pave the way for a new era in Chilean politics, since it had 
the effect of facilitating and legitimizing the fonnation of coalitions. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MODERN PARTY SYSTEM (1925 - 1970) 
Introduction 
The emergence of distinct blocks through coalitions of the Right, 
Center, and Left, was brought about by swift changes in Chilean society. 
The industrial revolution, the building of major urban centers, and the 
emergence of a proletariat and an intellectual middle class, together 
with the decline of the traditional oligarchy that had ruled Chile since 
1891, moved Chile into a social revolution. This revolution, although 
not quite in the tradition of Mexico, was led by the middle sectors with 
support from the proletariat; it was to lead Chile into a new era of 
presidential supremacy and more stable political institutions. 1 
This chapter will be concerned with the development of the three 
major blocks in Chile. At the beginning of the twentieth century the 
traditional elites continued to hold political power and to control the 
electoral process, since only about ten per cent of the population was 
registered to vote. However, about ninety per cent of those registered 
voted. By the 1950's the percentage of the population so registered had 
! 
increased to eighteen and by 1963, to thirty-thr'ee per cent, ·showing a 
1For an excellent study on political change and the middle sectors 




trend toward broader political participation. 2 
The Chilean Right will be examined first, because it has enjoyed 
the support of the traditional elites and of the two oldest and more 
conservative parties in Chile, the Liberal and Conservative Parties. 
An analysis of the Radical and Christian Democratic Parties wi~l ensue, 
since they occupy the Centrist position, and, finally, the last section 
will deal with the Left and its development into the Popular Unity 
Coalition of 1970. Although a major portion of this section is 
descriptive, it will hopefully provide the reader with the necessary 
background on Chilean party development as a prelude to understanding 
the dynamics of coalition behavior in Chile. 
The Chilean Right 
The Chilean Right has been made up of two major parties with deep 
roots in the nineteenth century, parties whose base of support has been 
in the traditional elites. These two major parties are the Conservative 
and Liberal Parties. 
The evolution of these two parties in Chile was similar to that of 
other Latin American countries. The Liberals became the representatives 
of the urban elite, while the Conservatives represented the landholding 
1 . 3 e ite. Chile was no exception to this fact but, as shall be seen later 
in this chapter, the Chilean Right was to pursue a ,somewhat different 
path from the rightist parties of most other Latin American countries: 
the two major parties would eventually form an alliance. 
2Gil, Political System, p. 211. 
3Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties· 
(Knoxville, 1967), p. 4. 
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Throughout the 1920's and 1930•s, during the government of Arturo 
Alessandri, the conservative Right did not suffer, despite Alessandri's 
coalition of middle class, reform-minded followers. Alessandri was too 
busy maintaining himself in office and his socio-economic reforms were 
. . 1 4 minima • When Alessandri returned to office in 1932 at the head of a 
coalition of Radicals and Democrats, he resorted to strong arm measures 
to maintain control and initiate reforms. The lack of cohesion in his 
coalition caused Alessandri to shift to the right, so that, by 1938, he 
left office with Liberal and Conservative support. 
Despite this success by the Right, events began to take place that 
would contribute to keeping the Right out of the presidency until 1958. 
First, there was the appearance of a small industrial proletariat which 
combined with the middle class to form a substantial sector of the 
' 5 
population. A second factor was a gradual intellectual awakening of a 
large segment of the middle elites, who became familiar with European 
trends. Thirdly, the government bureaucracy was.inefficient and often 
corrupt. The country experienced harsh, repressive measures for even 
minor disturbances. Finally, such social revolutions as the Mexican and 
Russian greatly influenced the thinking of these elites. 6 
These factors and the general economic crisis of the post-World War 
I period were to bring about two great changes in the Chilean political 
tradition. The first was the Constitution of 1925, already discussed in 
4 
Petras, p •. 99. 
5 John J. Johnson uses the term "middle sectors'' because of the 
economic implications of the term ''class", however, I find the rela-
tionship of this term to economic, social, and cultural determinants 
very important in Latin America. 
6 
Stevenson, p. 28. 
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the first section of this chapter. The second was the victory in 1938 
of the Popular Front, a coalition of center-left political parties. The 
success of the Front in procuring the election did not completely . :. 
eliminate the Right from political power. Both rightist parties had 
great influence in Congress since, in the parliamentary elections of 
1937, the Right maintained its strength in Congress and a clear 
majority in the Senate. (See Table IV). 
TABLE IV 
CONGRESSIONAL SEATS AFTER THE 1937 ELECTION 
Coalition Parties 


















































Source: John R. Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Westport, 1942), 
pp, 96-97, 
Rightist causes also had support in the conservative wing of the 
Radical Party (a leading member of the Front). Through legislative 
vetoes, the Right was able to prevent substantial social and economic 
refonns that would have uprooted its power. Although the traditional 
oligarchy did not "rule" Chile between 1938 and 1958 ( through the 
presidency), it did limit the scope,of action of the left-of..:center 
coalitions that elected the President? A partial explanation for the 
success of the Right in 1937 'and its failure in 1938 has b.een given by 
Gil, who states that "the rightist parties managed to preserve their 
majority in Congress, but thanks only to systematic bribery and whole-
1 b . 8 sa e vote uying. 11 Another explanation is the fatal mistake made by 
the Rightist in nominating a man who was "widely hated and even more 
9 
widely feared,'' as was their presidential candidate. This man was 
Gustav Ros, a man of strong fascist tendencies who alienated the more 
progressive elements of the Right and forced their defection to the 
33 
Front. In 1942, the Conservatives and Liberals united with the Nazis to 
support the fonner dictator, Carlos Ib~nez, for the presidency. 
Although this was a close race, the victory went to Juan Antonio Rios, 
the candidate of the Democratic Alliance ( the new "Popular Front"), a 
coalition of center-left parties. Despite the loss, the Right was to 
see a steady increase in support until 1953, when division and general 
revolt against the traditional parties was to cut their percentages 
almost in half. lO Tables V and VI indicate the steady increase of voter 
7 
Petras, P• 100. 
8Gil, Political System, p. 68. 
9 Stevenson, p. 78. 
10Ibid. 
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Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 
1963), p, 23. 
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Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 
1963), p. 24. 
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support for the Conservatives and Liberals up to 1953 and then a 
decrease in support up to 1963. The Conservatives had their largest 
margin in 1950, with 25.8 per cent of the vote, which was the highest 
11 percentage polled that year by any party. 
The rise and fall of the Right occurred because of the various 
shifts and alliances that took place in the 1940 1 s and 1950 1 s, For 
example, in the 1946 presidential election, the Liberals and Conserva-
36 
tives aligned together to support Fernando Alessandri, son of the fonner 
-President, A progressive faction of the Conservative Party ( the Social 
Christian wing), splintered and joined the Falange Nacional in support 
of Eduardo Cruz-Coke, a popular leader of th~ splintered group. 12 The 
coalition of center-left parties nominated Gabriel Gonz~lez Videla, a 
leader in the Radical Party. When neither candidate polled fifty per 
cent of the vote needed to win the.election outright, the election had 
to be decided by the Congress. Gonz~lez Videla had the largest percent-
age of popular votes, but his election in Congress depended on the 
Liberal Party, since the Conservatives and the supporters of Cruz-Coke 
refused to give him support. After some bargaining, the Liberals 
decided to throw their support to Gonzilez Videla. They justified their 
action to the other members of the Right, arguing that by joining in the 
government with the Conununists, they would exercise a vigilance over the 
L f d b 1 h . f h S . "d 1 13 et an serve to a ance t e extremism o t e ov1et 1 eo ogy, This 
shift by the Liberals lost them some support among the more conservative 
11 · Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D,C,, 1963), 
p. 24. 
12Gil, Political System, p. 72. 
13 
Duran Bernales, p. 426. (Translation is mine.) 
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members of the party, but an internal struggle persisted in the govern-
ment and the Liberals soon withdrew from the coalition. By 1952, 
Conservatives and Liberals had joined forces once again, this time in 
support of the Liberal candidate, Arturo Matte Larrain. This election, 
however, saw the return of Carlos Ib,~ez to the Presidency, who won 
considerable support from the Left. This was due mainly to his strong 
stand against the existing government and to his pledge to legalize the 
Communist Party. This l~ftist support, along with some conservative 
support resulting from his image as a Peronista type leader, gave the 
1 . b 14 e ect1.on to I. anez. 
Between 1952 and 1958, two major events occurred that were to have 
a profound effect on Chilean politics in the future. One was the form.a-
tion of a coalition of leftist parties called the Popular Action Front 
(Frente de Acci6n Popular or FRAP). The other was the alliance of the 
Falange Nacional and the Christian Socialist wing of the Conservative 
15 
Party into a new party called the Christian Democratic Party. By 
1958, the three major blocks were in close contention. The traditional 
Conservative Party, now calling itself the United Conservatives, formed 
a coalition with the Liberals to support Jorge Alessandri. The leftists 
supported Salvador Allende, a Socialist and the Christian Democrats 
nominated Eduardo Frei, "a figure of great appeal to intellectuals, 
technicians, non-Marxist leftists, as well as Catholics'! 16 In a hard 
fought campaign, Alessandri barely defeated Allende by only 33,500 
14Gil, Chile: Election Factbook, p. 33. 
15Gil, Political System, P• 80. 
16Ibid •. 
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votes, thereby bringing the rightist parties back to the presidency 
after nearly twenty-five years of center and left domination of the 
office. However, it was to last only the six years of the presidential 
term, since reforms were difficult to undertake. Gil describes this 
period as follows: 
During the Alessandri administration, Chile's economy showed 
little improvement, while popular demands became more pressing. 
The administration relied on import restrictions, wage ceil-
ings, and currency controls, all unpopular measures which were 
only partially successful. In spite of Alessandri•s great 
personal popularity the period was characterized by govern-
mental irresolution, The rightist forces in control of the 
administration, even if they conceded the need for social 
reform, remained generally committed to the past and. p·roved 
unable to carry out the radical alterations demanded by 
Chilean society.17 
In 1961, the Radical party joined the Conservative-Liberal coali-
tion and formed the Frente Democratico, or the Democratic Front, By 
' 
1964, the three blocks were formed and ready for the election. The 
Right was made up of the Democratic Front, a center-right coalition, 
The Center was made up of the Christian Democrats, and the Left was 
composed of the FRAP coalition. But, in the congressional elections 
preceding the presidential elections, in the conservative agricultural 
Curico Province, the candidate of the Left won a surprising victory, 
which caused the break of the rightist coalition as,, the Radicals with-
18 
drew. Julio Duran, the candidate of the Democratic Fro~t, also with-
drew from the race, which left the Christian Democrats and FRAP by 
themselves in the election. Fearing a leftist victory, the Conserva-
.. 
tives and Liberals gave their support to the Christian Democrat, Eduardo 
1 \bid~, p. 81. 
18 b'd 8~ I 1 • ' P• t· , 
F ' h h 1 ' 19 re1, w o wont e e ect1on. Despite this support in the election, 
Frei did not return the favor. He 
refused to name Conservatives and,Liberals to cabinet posts, 
and determinedly pushed programs, such as tax reform and the 
organization of slumdwellers, that are the anathema of the 
Right. 20 
As a result, Frei not only received sharp attacks from the Left, but 
also from the traditional Right, In 1966, Conservatives and Liberals 
united in a permanent alliance and called themselves the National 
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21 
Party. The two parties realized that the road to victory could not be 
reached by going their separate ways or by loose and temporary coali-
tions. Table VII shows the percentage received by the Right, first as 
separate parties in 1963 and 1965, and then as the National Party in 
1967 and 1969. By combining their strength, they came second only to 
the Christian Democrats in 1969 and, in the 1970 presidential election, 
the National Party polled 34.9 per cent of the vote, only slightly 
behind the victorious Allende Popular Unity coalition. 
A combination of factors, such as the prominence of their candidat~ 
Jorge Alessandri and his lead in the early polls before the election, 
gave the National Party the confidence and vitality that might lead it 




p• 51 . 
W. Grayson, Jr., "The Frei Administration and the 1969 
Elections,'' Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIII < 1969), 
.. 
21H. E. Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 
1920-1970," Government and Opposition, VII (1972), p. 386. 
22Ibid. 
TABLE VII 
PERCENTAGES OF VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR CHILEAN 
PARTIES IN RECENT MUNICIPAL AND 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
Elections 
1963 1965 1967 
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1969 Parties 
Municipal Congressional Municipal Congressional 
% % lo lo 
Communist .••.•••• 12.4 12.4 14.8 15.9 
Socialist .•.•.••. 11. 1 10.3 13.9 12.3 
Radical •.•. ,,,,,, 20.8 13.3 16.1 13.0 
Christian Dem.,,, 22.0 42.3 35.6 29.6 
Conservative,,,,, 11. 0 5.2 
Liberal •.•••.••.. 12.6 7.3 
National., .•. ,.,. 14.3 20.0 
Other .... ., .......... 6.7 6.2 3. 1 5.2 
Null and Blank .•. 3.4 3.0 2.2 4.2 
Total.,,.,.,. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sour'ce: Arturo Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System," 
Comparative Politics, IV (1972), p, 186, 
The Chilean Center 
The Chilean Center is composed of two extremely versatile and 
enterprising political parties, the old Radicals and the new and dynamic 
Christian Democrats, Their relative strength throughout the twentieth 
century, their mobility within the system, and their strong middle class 
support has kept these two parties in the mainstream of Chilean politics 
for over thirty years. Unlike the Right, the Chilean Center has had 
greater input in the modern period with respect to coalition formation 
and has played a key role in the balancing of extremes by being what Gil 
41 
calls, "the center of gravity of Chilean politics. 1123 For this reason 
and the factors stated above, the discussion of the Center will be 
divided to show the distinct role each party has played in this modern 
period. 
The Radical Party 
Prior to 1920, there were two basic coalitions to which most 
parties aligned. One was the conservative coalition of which the 
Conservative Party was the major force; the other was the "Liberal 
Alliance" headed by the Radical Party. The Liberal Party, although 
aligning with the Conservatives most of the time, did play a centrist 
role at times, shifting from one coalition to the other. When the 
Liberal-Conservative alliance became stronger, the Radical Party began 
to draw greater support from the middle class and developed ideological 
. . f d . 1 · . 24 strategies ranging rom mo erate socia ism to communism. 
In the preceding discussion of the Right, it was noted that in 
Arturo Alessandri's 1932 election as President, he obtained some support 
from the middle sectors. But, by 1938, he had shifted and was heading a 
government of Conservatives and Liberals, During his administration, 
Alessandri felt that he needed the support of the Rightists due to their 
strength in Congress. He therefore appointed many of their leaders to 
high government posts. The Radicals, angered by this and by restric-
tions of personal freedoms, withdrew from his administration, leaving 
the cabinet in the hands of the Conservatives and Liberals. Despite 
23Gil, Political System, p, 75. 
24ibid., p. 63. 
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strong disagreement between the Radicals and the extreme Left, economic 
problems were to thrust the Radicals into a coalition with the Left 
against Alessandri and the Right. This coalition, known as the Popular 
Front, began to take shape in 1936. In that year, several major strikes, 
accompanied by direct presidential intervention through the use of the 
anny, resulted in an appeal by the Socialists to the Radicals:.and 
Communists to unite in a "Block of the Left.11 25 
Although many Radical leaders opposed the Front, the coalition was 
fonned, representing, as Stevenson states, "a symbol of union in the 
minds of the masses, union against oppression, union for the achievement 
of all those things they had always deserved strongly, yet always some-
how been denied.11 26 This new Front consisted of the Radicals, 
Communists, Democrats, Socialists, and other smaller left-of-center 
parties. Of these parties, the Radical Party, with the most experience 
and largest support, took over the leadership of the Front. After some 
heated debate and what appeared to be a serious deadlock in the nomina-
tion of a presidential candidate for the 1938 election, the nominee of 
the Socialist Party, Mannaduke Grove, withdrew and gave the nomination 
to a moderate leader of the Radical Party, Pedro Aguirre Cerda. 27 The 
opposition consisted of Gustav Ross, an extreme-rightist, representing 
the Conservative-Liberal coalition, and Carlos Ibtnez of the "Popular 
Liberating Alliance," a coalition of the Union Socialist Party and the 
28 Chilean Nazi Party. 
25 Stevenson, p. 65. 
26 b'd 72 I 1 • , p. . 
27Ibid., p, 77. 
28Gil, Political System, p. 68. 
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The strength and popularity of the Front,indicated that, for the 
first time in Chilean history, the middle and lower sectors of society 
were in serious contention for political power with the traditional 
elites. The election was won by the Front, but only by a few thousand 
29 votes. However, the victory in the election was not destined to bring 
pennanent unity to the Front. By 1941, the Popular ·Front had broken up, 
largely because of internal divisions. Such factors as the Communists' 
decision to stay out of the government, their conflicts with the Social-
ists, the conflicts between the Radicals and the Socialists, and the 
strong opposition of the Right in Congress all contributed to the 
eventual disintegration of the Front. However, by means of several 
other coalitions, the Radicals were able to stay in the presidency until 
1952, with the election of Carlos Ib~ez. In 1942, a coalition of 
Radicals, Agrarians, Socialists, Democrats, and Connnunists supported the 
candidacy of Juan Antonio R!os. His opponent, Ib.iriez, was supported by 
the Conservatives and Liberals. 30 The victory of R!os maintained the 
left-of-center coalition in power, but internal struggles ensued, due 
largely to the leadership role claimed by the Radicals. The Radicals 
won the presidency in 1946, with the election of Gabriel Gonzilez 
Videla, The election was decided in the Congress where, the Liberals 
bargained and threw their support to Gonzilez Videla. But, as'noted 
earlier, the Liberals soon withdrew from the coalition. By 1948,. the 
Communists had also withdrawn. Because of his strong stand against 
communism, Gonzllez-Videla obtained from Congress "The Law for the 
· 29 Aguirre received\ 222, 700 votes and Ross 218, 609. 
30cil, Political System, p. 7i. 
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Permanent Defence of Democracy," which outlawed the Communist Party. It 
was this type of division, together with the lack of control and the 
"inabili:ty to perform the function of moderator by elevating themselves 
above everyday partisan politics," that brought about the demise of the 
31 
Front. 
By 1952, the Chilean electorate was ready for a candidate that 
would be "above politics," as Carlos Ib~nez claimed to be and won. By 
the end of his administration, Ibt~ez had become a rather unpopular 
figure among the masses. He sought support from the Right and angered 
the progressives in those parties that had helped his election. The 
Radicals improved their position but, by 1958, they were 
no longer able to make a strong appeal to independent elements 
of the Left and, unwilling to make the necessary concessions 
to permit this rapprochment, they found themselves isolated 
for the first time, and fought a hopeless battle for their 
candidate, Louis Bossay.32 
Alessandri's victory in 1958, and the good showing of the Liberals and 
Conservatives in the 1960 municipal elections, prompted the Radicals to 
form a coalition with the rightist parties, called the Democratic Front. 
In the 1961 congressional elections, the Radicals represented the only 
33 
party in the new Front able to "maintain its voting strength." How-
ever, by the 1964 election, the coalition had broken, with the Conserva-
tives and Liberals giving their support to Frei, as the Radicals went 
their own way with Julio Dur~n. Since 1964, the Radical Party has 
remained "a center party, highly political, willing to negotiate with 
31 
Moreno, p, 164. 
32Gil, Political System, p, 81, 
33Federico Gil, The Chilean Presidential Election of November~ 
1964 (Washington, D.C~.,~1965), p, 21. 
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f h . 34 anyone near power ors ort-run gains." In 1970, this proved to be 
true, as the Radicals joined the Left in a coalition called the Popular 
Unity Front under Salvador Allende. 35 
The ideological tenets of radicalism in Chile are very similar to 
the doctrinal situation in France and Italy; that is, opposition to 
oligarchal authority and the defense of individual freedoms. The 
radical philosophy included a strong belief in secularism, i.e., anti-
clericalism, progress in education and a return to parliamentary govern-
36 
ment. The fonner senator and leader of the old Radical Party, 
'Florencio Dur6n Bernales, observed that the Radical Par~y had found that 
it was wiser and easier to accomodate a political doctrine that would 
meet the mentality of the country, rather than to distuJb the country by 
. d. f . d · d · 37 attempting to mo i y it towar s certain octrines. Tliis !11-entali:ty · 
had a tendency to keep the Radical Party in the center, act1ing as the 
equilibrium between more extreme factions. In general, the heterogene-
ous nature of the party allowed it to shift from one coalition to 
another. At the same time, this flexibility contributed to an eventual 
erosion of popular support. In most elections between 19~8 and 1963, 
the Radicals received the largest percentage of the vote (see Table 
VIII) but, since 1963, their support has been eroded by the stronger 
Left. 
34 
Ronald H, McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America 
(Chicago, 1971), p. 124. 
35Greater discussion of the fonnation of this coalition will be 
found in Chapter Four. 
36 
Snow, p. 479. 
37 ,, 
Duran Bernales, p. 26. (Translation is mine.) 
TABLE VIII. 
PERCENTAGES OF VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR CHIJ.EAN PARTIES IN MUNICIPAL 
AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1937-1969 (1) 
Elections 
Parties 
1937 1941 1944 1945 1947 1949 1950 1953 1956 1957 1960 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 
c c M c M c M c M c M c M c M c 
Conservative 21. 3 17. 1 22 23.6 21 22.7 26 10.1 18 13.8 14 14.3 11.4 5.4 14"6 2d O 
Liberal (4) 20.7 14.0 14 17. 9 14 18.0 16 10.9 12 15.3 16 16.1 13:2 10.1 ' ' 
Radical 18. 7 21. 7 24 20.0 21 21. 7 24 13.3 23 21. 5 21 21.4 21.6 12.8 16.5 13.8 
Christian Democrat (2) ---- 3.4 3 2.6 4 3.9 4 2.9 7 9.4 14 15.4 22.0 41.1 35.6 29.6 
Socialist 11.2 16.7 7 12.8 8 9.3 10 14.1 11 10.7 9 10.8 11.5 10.5 14.2 12.3 
Communist (3) 4. 2 11. 8 8 10.3 16 ---- -- ---- -- ---- 9 11.4 12.7 11.2 15.0 15.9 
Other ·( 5) 23.9 15.3 22 22.8 16 24.4 20 48.7 29 29.3 17 10.6 7.6 8.9 4.1 9.2 
Total,, .••••••••••.••• 100.0 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 
"' .................. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston, 1966), p. 215; Fransisco Jose Moreno, 
Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York, 1969), pp. 196-197; Arturo Valenzuela, ''The 
Scope of the Chilean Party System," Comparative Politics, IV (1972), p. 186. 
Notes: (1) There are some small discrepancies in the data offered by Gil, Moreno, and Valenzuela. How-
ever, this is probably due to rounding and the approximations will suffice for this study. 
(2) The Christian Democratic Party was known as the Falange Nacional up to 1957. 
(3) The Communist Party was outlawed between 1948 and 1958, 
(4) The Conservative and Liberal Parties fonned a pennanent alliance in 1966 and call themselves 
the National Party. 
(5) "Other" inclues: minor political parties, null and blank votes and temporary associations. 




I The Christian Democratic Party 
The origins of the Christian Democratic Party go back to 1935 and , 
the National Conservative Youth Movement which, together with the Social 
Christian wing of the old Conservative Party, broke away in 1938 to form 
the Falange Nacional. 38 By 1939, the party had built some support among 
workers, students, and young professionals and made an impressive pene-
tration into the Northern provinces, which are made up of predominantly 
proletarian population. This proletariat was thought to be in the ranks 
of the Connnunists but the more moderate views of the Christian Democrat-
ic Party had made their effect. The Christian Democrats also acquired 
further strength in some middle class areas which, in general, gave 
· 39 
them a broad base of support. The basic philosophy of the party, and 
the reason for its break from the Conservative Party, was the same as in 
other Latin American countries. Edward Williams gives three basic 
reasons for the split: first, the development of progressive student 
movements, i.e., the National Conservative Youth Movement. Second, 
these youth movements were strongly influenced by Social Christian ideas 
d h . d . . . h . . 40 an, t ir, growing opposition to aut oritanism. I.t should be noted 
that the Conservative Party, the party of the Church, gave only lip 
service to the encyclicals that tended to be progressive but, in fact, 
detested this liberalism and never intended to put these encyclicals to 
use. As a result, the youth and student factions of the Conservative 
38 
George W, Grayson, "Chile's Christian Democratic Party: Power, 
Factions, and Ideology," Review of Politics, XXXI. (1969), p. 149. 
39Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geograffa Electoral de Chile, (Santiago, 
1952), p. 47. (Translation is mine.) 
40w·11· i iams, p ... 17. 
48 
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Party broke away. 
Between 1938 and 1950, the Falange had slight support in elections, 
ranging from 3,5 per cent in 1941 to 4.7 per cent in 1950. 42 These were 
the years of the Popular Front and, al though some leaders of the F.alange 
served in the cabinets of Presidents R{os and Gonzllez Videla, they 
generally did not ally with the Democratic Front. There was some 
division within the party over its participation in the alliance with 
the Front, but the party remained fairly strong and united throughout 
the 1940• s and 1950' s. As is shown in Tables VIII. and IX, it was not 
until 1956 that the party began to gather el:ectoral strength. l;n 1957, 
support for ~banez was very low, which gave the Falange greater elector-
al support. In that year, the Falange united with the Partido 
Conservador Social Cristiano in an alliance that was to register impres-
sive gains. 43 This upward trend can be seen in Table IX; in 1953, the 
Falange received 2.9 per cent of the vote in the congressional election 
but, by 1963, it had become the largest single party, having gained 22 
per cent of the vote. In the 1964 presidential election, the candidate 
of the Christian Democratic Party, Eduardo Frei, gained an impressive 
44 56.1 per cent of the vote. 
The greatest support for the Christian Democrats has' come from the 
Catholic middle class. 1.t has been more or less a radical Christian 
party that has cut away at the base support of the Radical Party. l;n 
41 Ben G, Burnett, Political Groups in Chile, (Austin, 1970), p. 17h 
42 · 
Cruz Coke, p, 124. 
43 
Burnett, p. 178. 
44 
Grayson, The Frei Administration, p. 57. 
TABLE IX 




Key: ~ Congressional Elections Ir llllf Municip?l Elections 
Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 
1963), p. 26. 
49 
50 
its efforts to be a truly Christian ~arty, the Christian Democrats have 
attempted to attract members of other confessions in order "to transmute 
the party into a genuine non-confessional movement. 1145 In 1964, the 
Christian Democratic Party "promised to transcend the staid categories 
of 'left' and 'right' while reshuffling the nation's pyramidal socio-
economic structures in favor of the disadvantaged," thereby acquiring a 
46 
substantial part of the middle and lower class support. But, during 
his administration, Frei made some very serious mistakes, such as his 
unwillingness to organize a coalition government, thereby creating sharp 
conflict between his government and both the Left and Right. His posi-
tion as a "moderate" strained his efforts to carry out badly needed 
reforms to improve the hard hit economy. 
I 
The failures of the Frei administration made it difficult for 
Radomiro Tamie, the Christian Democratic candidate in 1970, to win 
, I 
I election, and the discontented electorate chose the candidate who 
promised the fastest short term solutions, Salvador Allende of the 
47 
Left. The 1970 election, which saw Allende defeat Alessandri by only 
40,180 votes, was decided by Congress, since neither candidate had 
received the fifty per cent popular vote majority needed to win. It was 
in the Congress that the Christian democrats did some bargaining and 
received assurances from Allende that he would respect the Constitution 
and its guarantees. In return, he was promised support by the Christian 
Democrats, Allende agreed, and defeated Alessandri with support from 
45Gil, Political System, p. 274. 
46 
Grayson, The Frei Administration, p. 49. 
47constitutional law precludes the president from serving two 
consecutive terms. 
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the Christian Democrats and other smaller left-of-center parties. 
Actually, Allende's victory had been assured during the Frei 
Administration, largely because of Frei's inability to curb inflation. 
In 1964, Frei inherited a 38 per cent inflation rate from the previous 
administration of Jorge Alessandri, which was brought down to 17 per 
cent by 1966. By 1969, inflation had again risen to 30 per cent and, by 
48 
1970, to 35 per cent. 
Breaking the Chilean tradition, Frei refused to make a formal 
coalition with other parties and could get his programs passed 
only with the alternating support of the right or the left, 
depending on the program. For example, the agrarian reform 
was supported by the parties of the left, while the partial 
nationalization of the copper comQanies and anti-inflationary 
laws passed with rightist votes.49 
Despite the 1970 loss to Allende, the Christian Democrats promise 
to be a force to contend with in the future. Their centrist position 
during the Allende administration and the failures of that administra-
tion should help the Christi.an Democrats, who have a resourceful and 
intelligent leader. 
The Chilean Left 
Like the Center, the Chilean Left has consisted of two major 
political parties and some smaller parties and movements. The two major 
parties, the Cormnunists and the Socialists, have occupied the key posi-
tions in all coalitions of the left, especially in the formation of 
those coalitions. This key position refers to their base of support and 
reception by the Chilean electorate. The supp9rt of the leftist parties 
48 
M, J, Francis and H, Verra Godoy, "Chile: Christian Democracy 
to Marxism," Review of Politics, XXXIII. (1971), p. 327, 
49 b"d 325 I. i • ' p. • 
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was in large part due to the political guarantees of the 1925 Constitu-
tion, which encouraged the rise of parties with middle and lower class 
support, 
Since 1925, there have been three major coalitions of the Left and 
Center, The first was the Popular Front of 1938 which, as mentioned 
previously, consisted of the Radical, Connnunist, Socialist, and Demo-
cratic Parties. The second major coalition was the Frente de Accion 
Popular, or FRAP, formed in 1956. It consisted of the Socialist Party, 
the Democratic Party of the People, the Democratic Party of Chile, the 
Labor Party, and the outlawed Connnunist Party. The third coalition was 
the present Popular Unity Front made up of the Socialist, Connnunist, 
Radical, and Social Democratic parties, together with a left wing 
faction of the Christian Democratic Party called the Movimiento de 
Acci6'n Popular Unitaria, or MAPU, and a small group called Acci6n 
Popular Independiente, or API, These parties had a long tradition of 
responsible participation in the Chilean political process. 
In Chile, a full generation before the Soviet revolution and 
many years before the Mexican revolution, a number of politic-
al parties and other groupings with a distinct socialist out-
look were already freely functioning. The present Radical 
Party was founded over a century ago; the Social Democratic 
Party--another member of the present Allende government--can 
trace its origins to the Democratic Party founded in 1887, 
while the Socialist Workers Party was founded in 1898, These 
developments were not paralleled elsewhere in the continent.SO 
The Communist Party, the first viable leftist party in Chile, 
formally joined the Third International in 1921. The Stalin-Trotsky 
conflict appeared soon after and the party split into two factions 
representing each group. In 1937, the Stalinist faction emerged as the 
50claudio Veliz, "The Chilean Experiment," Foreign Affairs, XLIX 
(1971), p. 445. 
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official party and supported the first left-of-center coalition, the 
Popular Front. The relative strength of the Communist Party is best 
exemplified by its early struggles to stay alive in the political 
system. During the 1920's, the Communists fought with Alessandri and 
Ibanez for control of the trade unions and, in the 1927 election, they 
ran the only_ candidate agains.t the dictator, Ib~ez. This move, how-
ever, brought harsh repressive measures against the Communists by 
Ib~'l'!ez and his regime. This, along with the internal division in the 
party, placed its future as a viable party of the Left in jeopardy •. 
However, once civil liberties were restored in 1931, the Communist Party 
was able to function effectively, largely because of its internal 
d . . 1 · d 51 1sc1p 1ne an perseverance. 
The.Socialist Party was not formed until 1933, when several small 
socialist groups united. Prior to 1933, there had been a coup, led by 
military and civilian elements under Colonel Marmaduke Grove. This coup 
proclaimed a "socialist republic'' which lasted only ten months before a 
rightist military coup took over the country. After this coup, the 
leftist groups were exposed to coercive and repressive measures from the 
52 government and, by 1933, had to unite to gain strength. 
In 1938, the Popular Front coalition was formed on a proposal by 
the Socialists for a block of the Left. Although the Radicals were)he 
~ajor contributors to the Front, the Communists and the Socialists 
received strong support from the Chilean working class, which was 
generally dissatisfied with the traditional parties. Once the Front was 
51 Cruz Coke, p. 49. (Translation is mine.) 




in power, the Connnunists stayed out of the government and capitalized on 
the failures of the Front. The socialists and Radicals were constantly 
in conflict over the leadership of the Front and, when the Radicals 
began to appease some of the more traditional forces, the Socialists 
53 withdrew from the Front. By 1941, the Popular Front was dissolved. 
Throughout the 1940•s and 1950's the Socialists experienced serious 
disintegration, due mainly to the cohesive and disciplined opposition of 
the Connnunists and the ideological differences within the Socialist 
Party itself. The numerous splits of the Socialists contributed greatly 
to the strength of the Communists who, in 1946, joined a center-left 
coalition under Gonz~lez Videla. Under this coalition, the Connnunists 
participated openly in the government for the first time, but it was 
only to last five months. 
I.t was clear that in the government coalition the only winners 
were the Communists. I.t also seemed clear that many who had 
fonnerly voted Radical were now becoming supporters of the 
Connnunists, while at the same time, because of the latter's 
high-handed tactics, many workers were returning to the Social-
ist fold. Furthennore, righist voters who were nonnally 
adherents of the Liberal Party were strongly reacting against 
the alliance of this party with the Communists and, in disgust, 
had now turned towards the Conservatives.54 
Soon thereafter, Gonz~lez Videla outlawed the Communists, and it was not 
until 1958 that they were allowed to return. This should have helped 
the Socialists, who were violently anti-Communist; instead,they split 
even more on the question of the suppression of the Connnunists. 
In 1956, the second major coalition of the Left began to take 
shape. I.t was called the Frente de Acci6'n Popular and it included a 
53Gil, Political System, p. 80. 
54Ibid., p. 7 3. 
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united Socialist Party, the Communists, the Labor Party, and some 
factions of the Democratic Party. This time the Center Radical Party 
did not join the coalition and the Left placed its hopes on the Social-
ist leader, Salvador Allende. In the 1958 preside~tial election, 
Allende ran against a very powerful leader of the tight, Jorge 
Alessandri. Although Alessandri won, he did so by'only 33,500 votes 
' 55 over Allende. The failures of the Alessandri government gave strength 
to the rapidly growing Christian Democrats who, in 1964, won a strong 
victory over FRAP, who again had nominated Allende. However, as Gil 
states, the leftist parties were not thoroughly defeated. 
The most significant development of the early 1960 1 s were the 
impressive gains made by the left FRAP coalition and by the 
Christian Democrats. A strong shift of the electorate towards 
the moderate and extreme left became clearly detectable in the 
congressional and municipal elections of 1961 and 1963, 
respectively. The leftist coalition continued to make inroads 
among the agricultural workers of central Chile. 56 
Like Alessandri, Frei suffered from economic problems and his 
refusal to coalesce with other parties made the prospects for major 
refonns difficult. By 1970, the centrist Radical Party had shifted to 
the leftist coalition which now called itself Popular Unity. Together 
with the Communists and the Socialists, plus some smaller parties and 
movements, they nominated Allende for the fourth consecutive time and,· 
this time, the electorate was willing to accept a leftist regime under 
Allende. Since this coalition will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter r· it is sufficient to show at present its ascendancy to the 
presidency. 
'55Ibid., p. 81. 
56rb 'd . 1 • ' p- 82 • 
56 
To stunmarize, the Left incrased its popular support after the 
1950•s in a rather impressive fashion. In the 1967 municipal elections, 
the Communists and the Socialists received their largest percentage of 
votes with a combined total of 29.'.2 per cent of the vote (See Table 
Vlll), compared to 1961 when they polled 22. 2 per cent. I;n the 1961 
election, the FRAP received 31 per cent and, in 1971, it received 50.9 
57 
per cent. Despite the difficulties of the Allende government, the 
coalition was able to win a majority of the vote. I;n the 1952 election, 
Allende polled 5.5 per cent of the vote as the candidate of the Social-
ist Party. l;n 1958, as the candidate of FRAP, he received 28.9 per cent 
and in 1964, again as the candidate of FRAP, he received 38.9 per cent. 
In the 1970 election Allende finally won the presidency with only 36.2 
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Source: Francisco Jos~Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in Latin 
America (New York, 1969), p, 195; J, Biehl del Rio and Gonzalo 
Fernlndez, "The Political Pre-Requisites for a Chilean Way," 
Government and Opposition, VII (1972), p, 214. 
Notes: (1) Bernardo Ib~~ez is not related to the fonner dictator, 
Carlos. 
(2) The only President to be automatically elected by winning 
50% of the vote. Election did not go to Congress, 
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION OF COALITION THEORIES TO 
CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, certain key factors have played a 
distinct role in Chilean coalition politics. Among them is the competi-
tive nature of the party system with respect to presidential coalition 
situations and congressional coalition situations. 
Historically, a number of presidential candidates, attempting 
to a.chieve a majority of the popular vote or merely to obtain 
voter support in more than two-candidate contests, have had to 
rely on the organized support of and identification with two 
or more political parties capable of mobilizing voter support 
in varying geographic areas where traditional voter alliances 
to certain political parties have been apparent.1 
Another factor that has played and continues to play an important 
role is the 1925 Constitution, which states that a candidate must obtain 
a majority of the popular vote and, if not, he must then be selected by 
the Congress. This provision offers an additional coalition situation 
in Congress aside from the continuous efforts to form winning coalitions 
for purposes of policy deliberations. At the presidential level, there 
is the formation of cabinets, usually representative of the electoral 
coalitions that elected the chief executive. The formation of cabinets 
certainly plays a key role in the maintenance of government coalitions 
1 Cope, Coalition Formation, p. 4. 
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and the stability of the system. 
A third factor to be identified in the previous chapter was the 
development of three major blocks, making the formation of coalitions 
on ideological lines much clearer. The Right, composed of the Conserva-
tives and the Liberals, joined together in 1966 to form the National 
Party and it continues to form coalitions of the Right in an attempt to 
offset the Left. The leftist parties have themselves continually formed 
coalitions, despite bitter past disagreements between the Socialists and 
Connnunists. They have now joined in a coalition of the Left roughly 
equalling that of the Right. The balance between them lies in two major 
Chilean parties, the Radicals and the Christian Democrats. The Radical 
Party was at one point (in the 1930's and 1940 1 s), the party with the 
widest base of support. It has been and continues to be an opportunist-
ic party, or what Sven Groennings calls a "pivot party, which is a party 
having coalition options," and, therefore, does not by itself seek to 
form coalitions; because of its diverse membership, the party awaits 
ff . . 1· . 2 o ers to JOin coa itions. The Christian Democratic Party gained 
steady support from the 1940's onward because it was alienated from the 
traditional Chilean parties; but the unwillingness of the Christian 
Democrats to join or form coalitions has caused their popular support to 
diminish. 
These and other variables have made Chilean politics ideal for 
coalition situations. However, several questions must be answered 
regarding the general features of coalition formation in an attempt to 
2sven Groennings, "Notes Towards Theories of Coalition Behavior in 
Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance," from Sven Groennings, 
E, W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, The Study of Coalition Behavior, 
p. 451. - -
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find patterns based on the foundations described in Chapter II.. For 
example, what major factors prompted the formation of coalitions? Were 
only minimum winning coalitions established? If not, why were there no 
minimum winning coalitions? Is the bargaining proposition more effect-
ive in predicting possible outcomes than the size principle? Are 
actors merely seeking to maximize payoffs? 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look back at 
some of the events leading to the formation of certain important coali-
tions so as to discern patterns that may subsequently be used to test 
the two theories. There are, however, certain problems that arise 
concerning applications to data. One of these problems is that of 
limited, unreliable and sketchy data. Much of the analysis in this 
paper is based on the pie~ing of data much in the manner one would work 
on a jigsaw puzzle: piece by piece from many different sources. These 
sources often differed in their presentation of facts, and thus it 
became a difficult task to distinguish the most accurate from the least 
accurate. The method employed in this study was one of looking at third 
and fourth sources and decide in favor of the fact which was reported 
most often. Another problem is that, although this study is not 
concerned with the maintenance of coalitions, that aspect of their 
behavior is related to their formation and in Chilean politics this 
relationship has been difficult to examine. Since the formation of a 
particular coalition may be related to the formation of a future one, 
many things may be said regarding the expected duration of the coalition 
to be formed. It will suffice to say here that we will deal with one 
coalition at a time and that factors such as future costs may be a 
subsequent object of study. 
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Applications to Chilean Congressional Elections 
Coalition situations in Chile have existed throughout its history 
and, ever since the 1925 Constitution, not a single party has been able 
to receive a majority of the popular vote in congressional elections, 
and only twice has any party received more than thirty per cent of the 
3 vote. As a result, parties have, since 1925, made strong attempts to 
build coalitions to gain control· of the power structures. Table X 
(page 56) indicates that in all but the 1952 election, winning candi~ 
dates were backed by coalitions of established parties or the tradition-
al parties in Chile. Ib~nez did receive support from a coalition of 
splinter parties and won the election due to resentment toward the more 
traditional parties on the part of the electorate. 
In the 1937 congressional elections, the Right, a coalition of the 
Conservatives, Liberals and Independent Liberals, gained a majority in 
the Senate (composed of 45 members) and considerable strength in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Together with other sympathetic rightist parties, 
they controlled 109 seats in the Congress, as opposed to 83 for the 
Center and the Left. 4 With other major political events of the times, 
this may have prompted the Center and Left to join a coalition which 
some have ,depcribed as "nothing more than an alliance formed in order to 
enable the Radicals to seize the presidency and thus obtain control of 
5 government patronage." 
3 
Valenzuela, p. 185. 
4 Stevenson, p. 96-97. 
5Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chil~·- (Cambridge, 
1965), p. 49. 
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In the 1941 elections, said to be one of the most orderly ever, a 
new coalition of the center-left gained just enough seats to have a 
majority, and, although many expected internal dissension, certain 
international events drew the parties together and the coalition 
. d 6 survive • After the death of the Radical President Aguirre, a new 
coalition was fonned, named the Democratic Alliance. This time the 
coalition consisted not only of the Radicals and major leftist parties, 
but of some centrist parties as well, such as the Falange, Democrats, 
and Doctririary Liberals. 7 However, this coalition was not to last very 
long. By 1944, serious problems caused factions to split, and by the 
1945 congressional elections, the coalition was too .weak. Despite this, 
a major surge by the Radicals and leftist parties gave the coalition a 
minimal majority in the Congress. By the 1947 municipal elections, the 
only party that was gaining was the Connnunist Party, which caused_a 
serious break with Radical President Gonzllez Videla, who fired the 
Connnunist ministers and fonned an all Radical cabinet. 8 Two years 
later, in the 1949 congressional elections, factionalism created an 
enormous ntnnber of parties, so that after the election there were four-
teen parties represented. The dominant coalition, however, was that of 
the Right, which counted 108 seats of the 192 seat Congress. The most 
significant gain of that election was by the Agrarian Labor Party (see 
Table XI), which received seventeen seats in the Congress. I.t was a 
pro-Ibanez party which set the stage for his presidential bid in 1952. 
6 
Stevenson, p. 114. 
7Gil, Political Systems, p. 71. 
8Ibid., p. 73. 
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Ib&iez, without the support of any of the traditional political 
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parties, won the presidential election of 1952. That marked the end of 
the dominance of the Radical Party. A coalition of small parties and 
ad-hoc groups was formed specifically to get Ib~nez elected and to play 
up some obvious discontent of the masses with the traditional parties. 9 
This fragmentation of the political system continued in 1953, when 
Ib'finez was able to win 88 of 192 seats in Congress. However, this was 
not a majority, and many of the small parties in the Ibanez coalition 
made demands which made the coalition inoperative. The failure of 
Ib,nez to keep campaign promises produced a complete turn-around in the 
elections of 1957, which resulted in a Right-Center coalition made up of 
\bid., p. 74. 
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the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties. They gained control of 
the Congress, winning 98 of the 192 seats. 
By 1958, the FRAP coalition of the .left had formed, but it was 
unable to command majorities in Congress. In the 1961 election, the 
Right-Center coalition retained control of the Congress, commanding 110 
of the seats but, in 1965 and 1969, the elections produced no winning 
majority coalitions, although the Left had its minority coalition. It 
was the Christian Democrats who held the closest thing to a majority 
with 95 seats in 1965 and 78 in 1969. 
The patterns of coalition formation since 1937 seem relatively 
clear despite their obvious failure at maintenance. First, rightist 
coalitions tended to have greater size ( this will be explained in 
greater detail later in the chapter), and their basis of support often 
came from small fourth and fifth parties, and, of course, from the pivot 
Radical Party since the 1950's. Second, the coalitions of the Left 
were, if not more durable, more rigid in their ideological position. 
This, perhaps more than anything else, contributed to their downfall. 
The coalitions of the Right were more pragmatic in that they seemed to 
clearly perceive the need to form and maintain coalitions for purposes 
of keeping the Left out. Many of the coalitions of the Left, well 
founded on ideological grounds, eventually gave way to coalitions of the 
Right because the rightist factions of the leftist coalition were able 
to arouse violent opposition from moderate members towards the Commun-
ists, perhaps the best organized party and one that made great gains in 
the 1940' s. I.t is interesting to note that the three major blocks have 
continued to compete and that a consolidation of parties has definitely 
taken place. The Conservatives are now united with the Liberals in the 
National Party, the Christian Democrats occupy the Center, and the 
Popular Unity fonns the Left. 
In order to apply the theories of Riker and Leiserson to Chilean 
congressional data, several steps had to be taken and, with preceding 
• account of the Chilean party system and history of coalitions, this 
application may be undertaken without much descriptive analysis. 
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The first step in the application is to note the basic assumptions 
of the two theories. How rigorous one wishes to be concerning these 
assumptions is of relative importance to their outcomes with respect to 
predictability. However, it is the opinion of the author that these 
assumptions may be used in the context of Chilean politics without much 
ado and that their conditions are readily met in the political setting. 
A second step in this application calls for noting the differences 
between actual minimum winning coalitions and the decision rule that was 
em.ployed at that time, With regard to this decision rule, it must be 
noted again that in Chile the Congress consisted of 192 seats, 147 in 
the Chamber of Deputies and 45 in the Senate, but that in 1970 this was 
changed' to 150 in the Chamber and 50 in the Senate. Therefore, a simple 
majority in the Congress up to 1970 would consist of 97 seats. The 
third step would consist of detennining whether the coalitions were the 
smallest possible. 
The first step will be outlined separately for Riker and Leiserson. 
The second step is largely contained in Table XII, and the third is 
deduced from Table XIIL 
The "size principle" contains five basic assumptions with regard to 
the parameters of the coalition situation. First, is the assumption of 
''n-person," an assumption which obviously is met, since there are many 
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actors, 9ften an indefinite amount. The second assumption concerns 
situations that are "zero-sum." Riker explains that this condition 
"assumes that gains and loss can be quantified and measured." This can 
be achieved but only in terms of aggregate votes or congressional seats. 
I.t is in this context that we can assume a zero-sum cqndition. The 
seats lost by one party will be gained by another. There is obviously a 
risk in dealing with such an illusive assumption; however, since this 
study will not use rigorous statistical applications and since we are 
dealing with situations of conflict, we can meet this assumption. The 
third assumption, that of side payments, can also be met here. Votes in 
the Congress can be traded and the inducement can be in the form of pay-
offs such as possible appointments to cabinet positions. As to the 
fourth assumption, i.e., the assumption of rationality, the nature of 
political activity in Chile in so far as winning elections is concerned, 
has been highly competitive and the actors have been strong maximizers; 
that is, the failure to make decisions on the best alternatives to 
gaining particular outcomes rarely existed, since other variables could 
also play a distinctive role and provide for a high cost affecting 
coalition formation. Finally, regarding the fifth assumption of perfect 
information, we may conclude that members of Congress, for example, know 
which party each other member belongs to and also what some of the 
boundaries of those parties are. With this type of information, an 
actor can infer possible coalitions and thereby enhance his ability to 
act rationally. Now, these over simplifications of some rather complex 
assumptions can only be made if we decide that, if the coalitions 
observed conform to the prediction of w°", then the size principle is 
! 
relevant to our purpose. Therefore, it may be possible to say that if 
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the coalitions observed are larger than minimum winning, it may have 
been because of imperfect information. 
Leiserson's bargaining proposition rests on three very basic 
assumptions which are all directly relevant to the Chilean situation. 
First, that "coalitions are worth forming,'' can certainly be said to be 
the case, as'._emphasized in Chapter Il.• Second, there is the assumption 
that only the actors in the winning coalition will receive payoffs. 
This is evident in that winning coalitions gain control of policy 
decision making institutions such as the Cabinet or Congress. Finally, 
according to_Leiserson actors 'must know the range of possible coalitions 
and the payoffs of each. As already observed, parties in Chile have 
been reluctant at times to join a coalition. One need only recall, for 
example, the Radicals in 1970, who did not wish to connnit themselves to 
any given direction until the promises concerning payoffs were especial-
ly attractive. 
To review the two theories, Riker states: 
Inn-person, zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted 
where players are rational, and where they have perfect in-
formation, only minimum winning coalitions occur.10 
Leiserson states: 
As the number of actors increases, there is a tendency for 
each actor to prefer a winning coalition with as few members 
as possible.11 
With the assumptions just considered, we may now see the actual 
results and verify which of the two theories has the better prediction 
potential. Table XIl. shows the difference between the size of the 
lOR.k 1 er, p. 32. 
111 · 1 · . . 90 e1serson, 11Coa 1t1on Government 1n Japan," p. • 
TABLE XIl. 
COMPOSITION OF CHILEAN CONGRESS 1937-1969 
Year of 
Election Cons L R s Comm CD Others 
1937 40 40 36 21 8 47 
1941 44 32 57 20 18 2 19 
1945 46 35 38 25 19 6 23 
1949 44 35 42 17 (1) 8 46 
1953 19 21 25 28 6 94 (2) 
1957 27 29 42 21 17 56 
1961 21 37 52 19 20 27 16 
1965 5 11 29 22 23 95 7 
1969 -39-(3) 33 19 28 78 3 
Notes: (1) Communist Party was outlawed from 1949-1959. 
-(2) In 1953 there was strong feelings on the partpf the 
Chilean electorate against traditional parties. 
(3) In 1966 the Conservatives and the Liberals united to 
become the National Party. 
Abbreviations: Cons - Conservatives 
L - Liberals 
R - Radicals 
S - Socialists 
Comm - Communists 




actual minimtnn winning coalition and the minimal majority need in the 
congressional elections since 1937. In only two cases, 1941 and 1945, 
were the actual coalitions minimum winning; otherwise the differences 
ranged from one to thirteen. Considering the size of Congress (a total 
of 192 members in both houses), those differences are not really great. 
However, if we rely strictly on Riker's assumptions, especially that of 
perfect information, only minimum winning coalitio~s should appear. One 
important point must be noted here, that is, that many parties in the 
Chilean system must be regarded as indissoluble. Thus, one could argue 
l 
that those coalitions with the smallest possible combinations are in 
actuality minimum-winning. However, Riker•s theory does not really 
allow for this, since the prediction concerns the actual maximization 
of payoffs, and actors would seek to exclude other actors not necessary 
for the coalition to meet the decision rule. 12 
Now, in order to see whether the winning coalitions in Table XIl. 
were the smallest possible, calculations were made on the data showing 
the number of seats captured by major parties in the elections from 1937 
to 1969. These are illustrated in Table Xlll.. 
Calculations (deduced.from data on Table XIX) show that in 1937, 
1953, 1961, and 1969, minimum winning coalitions could have been formed; 
of course, it would have meant the union of ideologically diverse 
12For additional notes on the size principle, see Robert L. Butter-
worth, "A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions," American 
Political Science Reivew, LXV (1971), pp. 741-745. Also see William 
Riker' s reply, American Political Science Review, LXV (1971), pp. 745-
747, and rejoinder by Butterwtjrth in the same journal, pp. 747-748. 
Also, see Martin Southwold, ''Riker' s Theory and the Analysis of Coali-
tions in Precolonial Africa," and Phyllis Peterson, ''Coalition Forma-
tion in Local Elections in the State of Sao Paulo, Brizil, 11 in Sven 
Groennings, ed., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), 
pp. 336-350 and 141-159. ~ 
TABLE XIll. 
DIFFERENCE (D) BETWEEN SIZE OF ACTUAL WINNING 
COALITIONS AND MINIMAL MAJORITI~S (M) IN 
CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS BETWEEN 







Actual Winning Coalition 
RIGHTIST COALITION: Conservative, 
Liberal, Independent Liberal, 
Agrarian, Nazi, Falange, Democratas 
POPULAR FRONT: Radical, Cormnunist, 
Democrats, Independent Democrats, 
Radical Socialist, Workers Soc. 
Falange, Agrarian 
POPULAR FRONT: Radical, Socialist, 
Connnunist, Democrats 
RIGHTIST COALITION: Conservative, 
Liberal, Nationalists 
1953 No Majority Winning Coalition 
1957 RIGHT-~ENTER COALITION: Radical, 
Conservative, Liberal 
1961 RIGHT-CENTER COALITION: Radical, 
Conservative, Liberal 
1965 No Majority Winning Coalition 

















parties such as the Conservatives, Communists, Socialists, and Liberals 
in 1961. A coalition of these four parties would have yielded exactly 
97 se~ts and would have satisfied Riker•s prediction. The same type of 
combinations in 1937, 1953 and 1969 would have yielded similar results. 
The four coalitions would have had 97 members and zero difference with 
minimal majority. It must be noted that we are dealing with majorities 
of both houses and that there have been no considerations made concern-
ing majority govermnents in command of both houses. The assumption has 
been made that a majority of seats in Congress comm.ands a winning 
majority. Since Ri~er•s theory failed to predict but two of nine 
outcomes, we may conclude that the application of the ''size principle," 
in so far as the Chilean Congress is concerned, is not particularly 
relevant. This is not to say that the size principle itself is not 
relevant, 'but that in so far as Chilean coalition formation is concerne4 
Riker has riot predicted well and, therefore, his principle may be a poor 
indicator of what may, in fact, occur in Chilean coalition situations. 
It may be inferred that in those cases where no majority coalition 
was present (see Table XIII), where minority govermnents existed, there 
are strong indications that actors were not simply and totally concerned 
with maximization. This may seem to infer that Chilean political 
parties were not sufficiently pragmatic for effective use of Riker•s 
theory. This is not the case, since the Liberals and Radicals have 
continually changed sides and formed new alliances with both the Left 
and the Right who, at the same time, sought coalitions with the centrist 
parties. It may suffice to say that the parties were ideologically 
pragmatic, which means that extreme parties would not seek coalitions 
with opposites because of obvious conflict, often deeply rooted in the 
past. 
Leiserson' s "bargaining proposition" has higher predictive value, 
particularly because its actors are not absolute maximizers concerned 
only with payoffs. While not overly concerned with such variables as 
7.2 
ideology, leadership, structures, etc., Leiserson does allow for such / 
variables to influence formation by accepting coalitions which would not 
be the absolute minimum. At this point then, we can say that, in 
actuality, Leiserson and Riker differ in their definition of minimum 
winning. To Riker, in the case of the Chilean Congress, Ttf1, must be 97 
seats. To Leiserson, it may be larger, so as to allow for parties of 
near or same ideology to form a coalition that would win but contain 
only the smallest possible combination. 
Applying Leiserson to Chilean data (Table Xll.), we note that he 
predicts both the 1941 and 1945 outcomes predicted by Riker. The 1937 
Popular Front coalition is larger than .;a. for both Riker and Leiserson. 
I.t was made up of several small parties, some of which could have been 
excluded, and the coalition would have remained winning. Ip. the 1949 
elections each member of the rightist coalition was necessary, there-
fore, it conforms to Leiserson's prediction. The 1957 and 1961 coali-
tions are also predicted by Leiserson, since all members were necessary 
for the coalition to win. Therefore, with the exception of 1937, 
Leiserson's model predicts all outcomes, including Riker•s. 
l.t would be inappropriate to conclude here without certain reserva-
tions that Leiserson is a better predictor than Riker. The two theories 
have only been applied to nine congressional elections, of which six had 
actual winning coalitions in Congress. Leiserson correctly predicted 83 
per cent of the outcomes to Riker's 33 per cent. However, these 
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· percentages may be misleading considering the number of elections 
studied, Further application of these theories may reveal a more 
significant relationship between the size principle and the bargaining 
proposition, For example, one may consider coalitions formed for 
specific policy votes or one may compare coalition formation in'various 
multiparty systems, thus subjecting both theories to a stricter test 
with a larger sample. 
Application to Chilean Presidential Elections 
As noted in the previous chapter, Arturo Alessandri came to power 
with the support of the powerful Radical Party, winning approximately 
13 55 per cent of the popular vote, However, he quickly came to odds 
with the Left, who had not supported his election; eventually, 
Alessandri's further moves to the Right drove the Radicals from his 
.cabinet, By 1936, with the Democrats also defecting, Alessandri was 
left with only about 34 per cent support in Congress, approximately half 
of it coming from the Liberal Party. 14 In preparation for the 1937 
congressional elections, the Radicals joined in a Popular Front with the 
Socialists and the Communists; however, it was not a complete move until 
1938. The right wing of the Radical Party continued to give support to 
Alessandri and, in the 1937 elections, :the Conservative block maintained 
control with approximately 43 per cent of the seats compared to about 34 
per cent for the Popular Front. In the presidential election of 1938, 
the Popular Front, consisting of the Radicals, Communists, Socialists, 
13 
Stevenson, p .. 57. 
14 
Cruz.coke, p, 53. 
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Democrats and other small left-of-center parties, captured the election 
by gaining 50.4 per cent of the popular vote, compared to 49.6 per cent 
for the Conservative coalition. Obviously, the coalition of Center and 
Left proved worthwhile. As Ernst Halperin states: 
That the Popular Front formula proved successful in Chile is 
to be attributed to a purely Chilean cause that had little to 
do with ideology and nothing whatso·ever to do with the inter-
national situation. The real basis for the construction of 
the Popular Front in Chile was merely the slightly left-of-
center Radical Party's desperate urge to obtain control of 
government patronage and the Conununists' willingness to help 
them do so, 15 
The decision point for a minimal winning coalition would have been 
220,655 votes, whereas the actual winning coalition polled 222,700 
votes, In this presidential election both Riker and Leiserson would 
have predicted the outcome, The Popular Front coalition had just enough 
parties, with no unnecessary members, to make it a minimum winning 
coalition, 
The relative success.of the coalition is debatable since it remain-
ed unstable until the death of the President in 1941. The major problem 
was bitter disagreement between the Conununists and the Socialists. In 
1942, when Jf?n A, R!os, another Radical, won the Presidency, again the 
coalition, this time under the name of "Democratic Alliance," was 
composed of Conununists and Socialists! . However, it also ended with the 
death of the President; in 1946, Gonz,lez Videla, a Radical candidate 
backed by Conununists and Liberals, took office, After about six months 
of rule, Gonzilez Videla outlawed the Conununist Party; from then until 
just prior to the 1970 elections, the Marxist left refused to join with 
15Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Conununism in Chile (Cambridge, 
1965), p, 47-48, 
75 
the Radicals in any coalition! However, as has been noted previously, 
the Radicals were an oportunistic party and the pragmatism of the Left 
in 1970 would draw the two groups together in a winning coalition. 
In the 1958 presidential election, Allende polled 28.9 per cent of 
the popular vote, nearly defeating Jorge Alessandri, who polled 31.6 per 
cent. In 1964, Allende increased his support to 38.9 per cent, but lost 
to Frei, who won a clear majority with 56.1 per cent. In both of these 
elections, Allende was backed by the Communist and Socialist Parties 
under the Fre te de Accid'n Popular (FRAP), coalition. By 1969, the mass 
support of the Christian Democrats under Frei was slowly deteriorating. 
Frei refused to compromise and join coalitions in.Congress, and dis-
agreement grew within the party over economic and social policies. 
This resulted in some rather severe factionalism within the party which 
eventually was to lead to its defeat at the polls. 
In addition to the problem of intra-party factionalism, the 
Christil:lri Democrats were caught between their commitment to 
maintain some ideological purity, which articulated a parti-
cular kind of social and political change through centralized 
technical planning, and an unsuccessful strategy of control-
ling the entire political system which would have aided in 
pulling ideological goals into full operation,16 
In 1969, a radical faction within the ChristiFn Democratic Party 
defected and formed the Movimiento de Acci6n Popular Unitaria (MAPU;), 
h . h h 1 d b "ld h 1 · C 1 · · 17 w 1c e pe to u1 t e Popu ar Unity oa 1t1on. This factionalism 
of the Christian Democrats increased the prospects of the Left, which 
h: d come close to winning in 1958 against three candidates, The support 
16 
Cope, Coalition Formation, p, 10, 
17J. Biehl del Rio and Gonzalo Fern,ndez R, "The Political Pre-
Government and Opposition, VII, (1972), requisites of the Chilean Way,'' 
p. 311. 
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of the Radicals now seemed to bring victory within the grasp of the 
Left, In the 1970 election, the Popular Unity, consisting of the 
Socialists, Communists, Radicals, Independent Popular Action Movement, 
Popular Socialist Union, Social Democrats, and MAPU, polled 36.3 per 
cent of the popular vot~ against 34.9 per cent for the National Party 
and 27,8 per cent for the Christian Democrats. The closeness of the 
vote, 40,180 votes between the two frontrunners, indicates that the 
coalition was probably minimum winning, although it is difficult to 
determine which coalition member was the unnecessary partner. This can 
probably be better explained in terms of Allende's election by the 
Congress. As stated previously, a candidate must have a majority of 
the popular vote or the election goes to the Congress, where a majority 
of two hundred members is needed to win. Table XIII shows the distri-
bution of seats in the Chilean Congress in 1970. The total number of 
seats controlled by Popular Unity was eighty and they needed one 
hundred and one to win. A coalition with the Democratic Radical Party 
would have given a margin of six votes, not enough to win, However, a 
coalition with either the National Party or the Christian Democrats 
(who now played the role of a pivot party) would have produced a winning 
coalition. Neither combination would have conformed to Riker•s progno-
sis, unless certain members within each of the parties were either 
denied or themselves refused to participate in the coalition. A coali-
tion of the National Party and the Left would have been virtually 
impossible due to their strong ideological differences. Therefore, only 
the Christian Democrats could be sought by either side and, in both 
cases, would have produced winning coalitions. With the Left they would 
have produced winning coalitions. With the Left they would control 155 
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~eats, whereas with the Right, 119. 
However, after some lengthy bar$aining, the Christian Democrats 
"exacted from Allende not only •••• Constitutional guarantees, but also a 
commitment that neither a Socialist nor a Communist would be appointed 
to the Defense Portfolio. 11 18 In return, they threw their support to his 
camp and Allende won with 153 votes, with 35 for Alessandri, seven blank 
ballots, and five absentees. 19 
Leiserson's bargaining proposition would have predicted this out-
come since there were no unnecessary members and it was minimal winning. 
It may be noted at this point that one inadequacy of the Leiserson model 
is that, although his prediction is correct, a coalition of the Right 
and Center would have been preferable to the actual winning Left-Center 
coalition, since it would have contained fewer members and, ideological-
ly speaking, would have been a more cohesive coalition. 
18 
Cope, p. 15. 
1 \bid., p. 16. 
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TABLE XIV 
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE CHU.JAN 
CONGRESS 1969-1970 
Senate 
Popular Unity Opposition 
Party Seats Party Seats 
Socialists 6 Christian Democrats 20 
Communists 5 National Party 5 
Radicals 7 Democratic Radical Party 2 
Independent Popular Action 1 TOTAL 27 
Popular Socialist Union 1 
Social Democrats 1 
MAPU 2 
TOTAL 23 














Source: J, Biehl del R!o, p. 316. 
Opposition 
Party Seats 
Christian Democrats 55 
National Party 24 




This study has attempted to answer two basic questions regarding 
the formation of political coalitions in multiparty systems. The first 
question relates to the idea of coalition situations. This involved 
inquiring into constitutional and extra-political rules of th~ game in 
order to determine coalition building potential. It has been shown that 
in Chile, where coalition situations exist, the chances for political 
parties, and especially for pivot and captive parties (parties with no 
bargaining power), to be included or excluded in a potential coalition, 
is a crucial variable to examine. Chile has had a long history of 
coalition situations in which parties have played all the traditional 
roles, as captive, pivot, and coalition builders. It is also interest-
ing to note that in Chile certain political parties have played differ-
ent roles at different times. For example, the Radical Party was a 
coalition builder in the 1930 1 s and 1940's. It had the largest base of 
support and was the leading partner in the Popular Front of 1938 as well 
as in the Democratic Front of 1941 and 1946. Once they broke with the 
Left, the Radicals began to lose support, so that, by the 1950's and 
1960 1 s, they played the part of a pivot party, as they lost their broad 
base of support and experienced a great deal of intraparty factionalism. 
Yet, in 1970, the Radical Party again played a key role in coalition 
situations by aligning with the Left in a winning coalition. 
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Another factor that has played a key role in the development of 
coalition situations in'Chile has been the development of the three 
major blocks. This has resulted in coalitions of the Left, Center and 
Right and also Center-Left, Center-Right, Left-Center and Right-Center. 
All these possible coalitions have developed in Chile with no excep-
tions. The ability for these coalition situations to take place has 
come about largely as a result of the competitiveness of the Chilean 
s_ystem, This made Chile a politically stable nation where tradition 
commanded that power be sought through the electoral process. This, in 
turn, necessitated the formation of political coalitions. As noted 
previously, at least since 1925 not a single party has managed to obtain 
a majority of the popular vote in a congressional election and, with the 
two exceptions of Carlos Iblnez in 1952 and Eduardo Frei in 1964, no 
presidential candidate has run without the support of a coalition of 
parties (see Table X). Furthermore, four of the nine elections since 
1925 have gone into Congress where often new coalitions had to be built 
or new members had to be added. Therefore, it may be noted that in 
Chile elections do represent the principal means of mobilization and, 
since pluralities often occur, they bring about coalition situations. 
The second question which this study addressed itself to concerned 
the conditions necessary for the actual formation of winning political 
coalitions in Chile. Under coalition situations, the primary goal of 
participants is winning and, therefore, "size" becomes a major concern 
with regard to coalition formation. This directly relates to the notion 
of pragmatism of Chilean parties. Noted previously was the callousness 
of the Radical Party in the 1938 and 1942 elections, wishing only to win 
and gain the presidency. In 1946, the Radicals again needed to form a 
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coalition with the Left to win the election; yet soon thereafter, 
Radical President Gonzllez Videla outlawed the Communists. Other 
examples cited were the alliances of the leftist parties ever since 
1925, often in bitter disagreement, but always attempting to win 
control. The same holds true of the Conservatives and Liberals, who 
managed to fonn several winning coalitions in Congress even though 
center-left candidates held the presidency. Therefore, the pragmatic 
character of Chilean parties led participants to seek winning coalitions 
and, in so doing, to consider size as a major factor in the fonnation 
process. This is not to say that size was the only concern, since the 
parties were obviously separated into the three ideological blocks and 
the two extremes never fonnally joined together to fonn coalitions. 
Thus, ideology was a factor that prevented certain possible coalitions. 
In 1953, 1965, and 1969, there were no majority winning coalitions in 
Congress, mainly as a result of ideological differences. However, size 
is a major factor when pivot parties play a significant role in the 
coalition situation, and this has been the case in every presidental 
election since 1925, with the exception of 1964. Pivot parties such as 
the Radicals o~ Christian Democrats, have tilted the balance both in 
outright majority victories as well as minority ones needing congres-
sional approval. To this end, size becomes a major factor for coalition 
builders in seeking victory. 
In the review of the literature, several of the most prominent 
works on the study of coalition behavior were discussed with the inten-
tion to show that the approaches to describing, hypothesizing, and 
testing the theories of political coalitions are quite diverse and that 
they, too, concern themselves with those conditions that detennine 
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possible coalitions. Of all these works, two have stood out as perhaps 
the most rigorous and inventive. Their importance is that they attempt 
to predict outcomes on the basis of size, relying on certain assump-
tions. While one may intuitively think that ideology, more than any-
thing else, would draw actors together to form coalitions, these two 
theories maintain that actors are maximizers and, therefore, seek only 
to win and will pursue coalitions that will win and maximize payoffs, 
regardless of ideology. The first of these works is that of William 
Riker, who developed the "size principle" as it relates to coalition 
formation. The size principle assumes that actors seek to maximize 
go,ls and payoffs and that this drives them to form the smallest 
possible coalitions where the division of payoffs will be the maximum 
for every member of the winning coalition. This concept is then strict-
ly concerned _with the size needed to win in a minimal fashion. Such 
variables as decision co~ts, ideological diversity, relative strength of 
actors in coalition, resources, leadership, social base and structures 
become secondary. Games are zero-sum, players are rational and they 
have perfect information about each other. These variables represent 
basic assumptions which then set the parameters of the size principle. 
The second work, thq.t of Michael Leiserson, states that actors do seek 
to maximize by participq.ting in winning coalitions, but not necessarily 
the smallest possible coalitions. That is, to Leiserson, a minimal 
winning coalition is one which has no unnecessary partners. Both 
theories basically assume that in coalition situations, where size is a 
primary concern, participants will seek minimum winning coalitions to 
insure the greatest distribution of payoff per member of the winning 
coalition. The key here is, of course; the term minimum. 
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lt has been found in this study that in applying these theories to 
Chilean elections, participants have sought winning coalitions, but not 
necessarily the minimum, at least not in terms of Riker 1 s size principle 
Only twice since 1925 has Riker's prediction been actually relevant for 
Chile, in the 1941 and 1945 congressional elections. In all other out-
comes, including presidential elections by Congress, coalitions have 
been larger than the minimum. Does this mean that participants are not 
concerned with maximizing payoffs? Not necessarily, since the outcomes 
conformed to Leiserson's theory, which assumes that participants seek 
to maximize payoffs. However, the participants do not seem to be always 
concerned with optimal maximization; that is, they will accept larger 
coalitions and share payoffs with larger numbers in order to win, but· 
will not include unnecessary partners. In essence, this is Leiserson's 
definition of a minimum winning coalition, and it provides for the 
flexibility that allows for such fa~tors as ideology, leadership, 
resources, etc., to affect the outcomes, although ''size" remains its 
principLl. tenet. I.t must be clear that this study was ultimately 
concerned with the utility of size a·~ a predictor, and the two theories 
were tested to determine just such an end. One can conclude that ''sizen 
is a major determinant, but that if it is used in and of itself without 
allowances for other variables, as mentioned above, its utility is 
seriously impaired. 
From all this, two major conclusions are reached regarding the 
conditions necessary for coalition formation. One is that, while size 
is normally treated as an independent variable, this study regards it to 
be primarily a dependent variable. Perhaps, by gaining some insight 
into the conditions of size alone, it can become a more accurate 
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indicator for coalition fonnation. We have established that by using 
Leiserson's bargaining proposition, size does become a useful too1 for 
prediction. The other conclusion stems from the first in that, while 
size is a necessary condition, it is not necessarily the only one. The 
description of the origins and development of the Chilean party system 
shows that such factors as decision costs and ideological diversity also 
played an important role in the fonnation of political coalitions. The 
flexibility of the bargaining proposition in not disallowing these 
variables results in a higher degree of accuracy in prediction. 
The usefulness of these two models has been tested in a very 
limited sense here. The inadequacy of Riker's model for Chile may not 
hold true for other systems. Therefore, further research is needed to 
test his hypotheses. Other multiparty systems may also lend themselves 
to such analysis and perhaps, with a more effective use of hard data, 
different conclusions might be reached. The basis for refinement of 
these two models is a rigorous study of situational variables which thi 
study has attempted to apply to Chile. That is, greater in-depth 
analysis of all factors and how they affect coalition fonnation may 
reveal other indicators that are more r~liable for purposes of explana-
, 
tion and prediction. A concluding note regarding the obje'ctives of this 
study is that it has not confined itself to the explanatory value of the 
two theories. It may be dangerous to asstnne that simply because one may 
encounter difficulties in prediction, they also cannot be used to 
explain. This is altogether too complex a point to discuss here, 
I 
except to state that this asstnnption should be regarded with the utmost 
care. 
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